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I. INTRODUCTION
FromAugust 15, 1971, to April 30, 1974, mandatory controls on
wages and prices were a component of the economic stabilization
policy of theU.S. government This experiment with "incomes
policy" was the first peacetime wage and price control program in
the United States. During the period, marked changes occurred in
the economic and political environment in the structure of the
program, in the rigor with which controls were administered or
were perceived to be administered, and in the rates of price change
that emerged. The pace of economic activity ranged from the early
stages of a slow cyclical recovery to an extraordinarily vigorous
boom in demand, followed by a period of short supply of basic ma-
terials, particularly petroleum products, and sharply curtailed pro-
duction growth. Consumer price inflation initially declined from an
NOTE: The research for this paper was supported by the National Science Foun-
dation (grant GS-43757), the Ford Foundation (grant 740.0510), and the American
Enterprise Institute. The fullversionof the study was presented at the Contrence
on Price Behavior and was published as Controls and Inflation: The Economic
Stabilization Program in Retrospect (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research, 1975). The version published here was shortened
at the suggestion of the discussant, R. A. Gordon. In particular, a section containing
an extensive discussion of the microeconomic effects of controls in specific markets
was deleted, but it may be found in the American Enterprise version.
121annual rate of slightly below 4 percent in the eight months preced-
ing controls to approximately 3 percent during thefirst year of con-
trols. But it rose to "double digit" rates of 11.5 percent in the eight
months before controls were ended and to 12.2 percent in the eight
months after controls were removed.
To assess the influence of controls as an economic policy tool
only in terms of what happened to the inflation rate while they were fi.B
in force would obviously be much too superficial. Price and wage
trends occurring under controls are conditioned by the need to
allow flexibilityfor adjustments in response to changes in the
market environment, or to adapt the controls so as to contain pres-
a sures for significant departures from equilibrium and to keep re- ti sources in the channels from which price suppression threatens to
divert them. During the period of controls, changes in overall de-
mand levels were of central importance in the market environment,
but changes in supply conditions for particular sectors originating
from both domestic and foreign sources were also important
The extent to which controls were intended to affect economic
goals other than prices—goals such as output, employment, invest-
ment, and efficiency—is relevant in an evaluation of the effects of
the controls. Other factors that form part of the context in which f
controls were administered, and that should be taken into account
in evaluating them, are such broader goals as limited bureaucratic
intervention in price decisions and collective bargaining, balance-
of-payment goals, international trade and foreign policy interests,
maintenance of a competitive industrial structure, and preservation
of private incentives to promote innovation and efficiency. Finally, e
a comprehensive assessment of controls should also include a look a
at economic conditions and prospects prior to the imposition of con-
trols and developments after controls were terminated.
The analysis and discussion in this paper are oriented toward an e
assessment of controls as a temporary and supplementary "incomes
policy" tool. The analysis will look at their possible marginal influ-
ence on inflation when they are administered with an emphasis on
avoiding serious short-term market disruption and minimizing ad- p verse long-term effects on the economy. Section II is a review of
the economic and political developments that preceded the imposi-
tion of controls. In section III we look at the design of the control
system and changes in the structure of the program. In section IV,
the consistency of wage and price behavior with the stabilization
regulations is examined by analyzing aggregate data on wage, price,
and profit developments. In the fifth section we explore the ques-
tion of inefficiency and distortions attributable to controls, and in
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sectionVI we address some broad issues concerning the role and
limitations of direct controls as a stabilization tool.
u.BACKGROUND
Initially,a policy of gradualism that became known as the "game
plan" was put into effect to reverse the rise in the rate of inflation
that occurred in the last half of the 1960s.1 Rapid expansion of
aggregate demand from 1964 through 1966, after a period of rela-
tively stable prices, had brought the unemployment rate down to
well below 4 percent, a lower rate than had been experienced in
the preceding decade. After a pause in 1967, aggregate demand
surged again in 1968. By 1969 the unemployment rate was 3.5 per-
cent, with real output growth tapering off and prices rising more
rapidly than before.
A gradual slowdown in aggregate demand growth began during.
1969. Adjustments in the economy in response to stringent fiscal
policy and slower monetary expansion were expected to run in the
following sequence:2 slower growth in total spending in the econ-
omy, slower production growth, pressure on profit margins and
slower employment growth, smaller wage increases, and finally
lower price inflation. The calibration of federal policy instruments
necessary to introduce an appropriate degree of disequilibrium and
the lags in the process were interrelated and uncertain. It was
essential to restrain total spending growth enough to set in motion
an adjustment process that would lead to deceleration in price in-
creases, but a longer-than-anticipated lag before prices began to
decelerate would result in lower real output levels and higher un-
employment than were intended.
By the end of 1970 inflation had proved to be more persistent
than had been expected. As a result real output was lower and
prices and unemployment were higher than the earlier official
projections.3 These conditions persisted during the first half of
1971. During the first half of 1971 both wholesale prices and the
private GNP deflator increased at rates roughly similar to those at
which they increased in the previous two years, although consumer
prices were increasing lessrapidly. The unemployment rate
hovered at 6 percent, up from 3.5 percent in 1969. There were no
clear indications that unemployment would be reduced appre-
ciably in the ensuing months through more rapid demand growth,
and the evidence that inflation was subsiding was tenuous. Further-
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 123more, the rateof price increase, particularly for wholesale prices of au
industrial commodities, remained high by the standards suggested
by the experience of the early 1960s, and the worsening balance of






Therewere several indications that the game plan was being st
played in economic overtime by the beginning of 1971. Unemploy-
ment had reached a level that threatened to be politically damaging t
to the Nixon administration in the absence of firm prospects that it
would recede. Public and congressional sentiment became increas-
ingly unfavorable toward the explicitly noninterventionist policies
of the administration and shifted toward a preference for direct c
action to restrain "excessive" wage and price increases, a
These conditions provided a climate in which the Democratic b
Congress enacted legislation in August 1970 authorizing mandatory t
controls. Whether or not such authority was used, the legislation s
could be used to embarrass the President and his party.4 Business t
attitudes were conditioned by two years in which profits were
ground between the millstones of rapidly increasing labor costs and
markets in which these costs could not readily be passed through
by increasing prices. In October 1970 the Business Council criti-
cized the lack of direct action on wages and prices, a criticism that Econ
wasreaffirmed in the spring.5 The Committee for Economic Devel-
opment, another business group, issued a policy statement in
November 1970 recommending establishment of a stabilization s
body to establish "broad norms" for wage and price behavior.6 On
the labor side, the AFL-CIO had taken a position in support of
"equitable" controls if the President determined they were neces- SI
sary,and George Meany had stated his view that they were.7 Also,
several high officials within the federal government had proposed
some form of incomes policy, the most prominent being Arthur
Burns, who had become chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
in 1970.8 '4
Faced with these developments, the administration was increas-
ingly on the defensive in maintaining its noninterventionist stance. q
In June 1970, the President established the National Commission
on Productivity and the Regulations and Purchasing Review Board,
and announced that periodic "inflation alerts" would be prepared
by the Council of Economic Advisers. In January 1971, the Presi- '
dentdirected the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy to
124 Kostersanalyze conditions in the steel industry in the wake of announced
price increases for some steel products. The Council of Economic
Advisers was to report immediately to the committee any "excep-
tionally inflationary wage or price developments"9 so that appro-
priate federal action could be considered. The Construction
Industry Collective Bargaining Commission had been established
in September 1969, and federal action had been taken to reduce
construction spending and encourage training of more skilled con-
struction labor, but there had been no relief during 1970 from
increasingly large construction wage increases and the pressures
they created for similar wage increases in other sectors. On
March 29, 1971, the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee
was established to place mandatory controls on construction wages.
After a review of the economy by the administration in June, de-
cisions were announced not to apply additional stimulus to demand
and not to establish an incomes policy. These statements proved to
c be the last strong official reaffinnation of the game plan.'° Larger
v j tradedeficits and the increased vulnerability of the dollar to mas-
• sive conversion into other forms of reserves were added to con-
s tinuing disappointing news on prices and production, triggering
e J thePresident's dramatic announcement of the New Economic
Policy on August 15, 1971.
h
EconomicConditions in Mid-1971
Bymid—1971 the game plan had been successful in bringing about
some elements in the sequence of adjustments envisioned for the
process of reducing inflation.'1 Slower monetary expansion corn-
bined with fiscal policy restraint had reduced the growth of total
- spending,slowed production and employment growth, squeezed
profits, and stabilized or reduced the rate of price inflation. The
I game plan had succeeded in achieving the early stages of the disin-
flation process, but further reduction in inflation depended on a
trend toward smaller labor cost increases that had not yet emerged.
While wages in some sectors were increasing less rapidly than be-
- fore,very large increases in other sectors kept average hourly labor
costs increasing at a roughly stable rate.
These developments raise two issues concerning stabilization
policy performance before and after controls were imposed. One is
I the extent to which the buildup of significant distortions in the
- wagestructure contributed to a slower unfolding of the disinflation
) process than had been projected. The other is the extent to which






Simproved balance in the wage structure and prospects for more
rapid productivity growth pointed to the possibility of improved
economic performance after 1971 with or without wage and price th
controls.
Wages and Collective Bargaining'2
The unemployment rate rose from 3.5 percent in 1969 to about 6.0
percent in late 1970. However, reduced growth of demand in labor
and product markets was not accompanied by smaller wage in-
creases. Adjusted average hourly earnings for the private nonfarm
sector rose by 6.7 percent in 1970 and 7.0 percent in 1971, indicat-
ing that wage rates were increasing more rapidly than they had
when unemployment rates were lower. New first-year wage in-
creases under collective bargaining agreements in manufacturing TAB
rosefrom an average of about 8.0 percent in 1969 to nearly 11.0 per-
cent in 1971 even though the unemployment rate in manufacturing
increased from 3.3 percent in 1969 to 6.8 percent in 1971.
Continuing large wage increases under new collective bargain-
ing agreements negotiated in 1970 and 1971 had their roots in
earlier trends in prices and other wages. Wages for workers covered
by long-term wage contracts negotiated in the late 1960s were de-
pressed relative to those of other workers who received wage in- Privat
creases that more quickly reflected the strong labor market demand
H and accelerating inflation that prevailed in the later period. When A
long-term contracts expired, there were strong pressures to restore T
the relative wage positions of the workers th€y covered through
heavily front-loaded new contracts because the deterioration of
S
their position in the wage structure had resulted primarily from an c
unanticipatedincrease in inflation. Colle
The influence of long-term contracts on the wage structure dur- agr
ing the period of rising inflation is evident in average hourly earn- fact
ings changes for industry sectors in which most workers were
covered by long-term wage contracts. Data on average wage in- Dl
creases in six major industry sectors in which most workers were OTE covered by long-term collective bargaining agreements with corn-
mon expiration dates show deterioration in the relative wage posi-
tion of these workers during the term of their contracts (Table 1).
These workers received smaller wage increases than were received
by the average private nonfarm worker in the two contract periods
shown for each industry between 1966 and 1971. When new agree-
ments were negotiated, average wages in the sectors covered in-
creased by more than average wage increases for private nonfarm
126 Kosters
-.---workers. In other words, there was a tendency to compensate at the
d time of negotiation for smaller wage increases during the term of
e the previous contract.
The data in Table 1 suggest that inflation-induced distortion in
the wage structure created conditions leading to unusually large
first-year wage increases in major union settlements, particularly in
1970 and 1971.13 These large negotiated wage increases con-
0 tributed directly to rapid increases in hourly labor costs and influ-
enced wage changes for related workers, impeding any significant
reduction in inflation in spite of considerable slack in labor and
n product markets.
A major share of the unexpectedly slow decline in wage and price
d increases in 1970 and early 1971 could have resulted from this
g TABLE1Increases in Average Hourly Earnings in Selected
IndustriesMainly Covered by Long-Term Collective
Bargaining Agreements and Wage Increases under





Private nonfarm 4.5 4.7 6.3 6.7 5.9 6.5
Rubber 3.4 5.6 4.7 5.4
Autos 2.9 8.6 5.5 13.1
Trucking 2.9 6.0 6.0 13.8
Steel 1.1 6.0 3.5 11.9
Metal cans 3.4 10.0 4.2 11.5




First-year increases 7.0 7.9 8.1 10.9










NOTE:Changes in average hourly earnings were computed as percent changes in the
average from the preceding year, except for the year in which new contracts
were negotiated. New contracts were negotiated in the rubber, auto, and truck-
ing industries in 1967 and 1970 and in the steel, metal cans, and communica-
tions industries in 1968 and 1971. The percent increase in average hourly earn-
ings in those industries for years in which new contracts were negotiated was
computed by comparing average wages for a six-month period after the new
contract was negotiated with the average for the same six-month period a year
earlier. The particular months chosen are shown in Marvin Kosters et a!.,
'Collective Bargaining and the Wage Structure," Labor Law Journal, August
1973, p. 522, Table 3.
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 127much more serious and pervasive pattern of distortion in the wage tio
structure than had been previously experienced during a cyclical me
slowdown in the economy. Imbalances in the wage structure and Pro
the large "catch-up" wage increases in 1970 and 1971 that reduced dwi
these imbalances created a transitional lag in wage developments. C
The pervasiveness of these imbalances also suggests that it would for:
have been extremely difficult to embark on an incomes policy that me
relied heavily on a simple numerical wage standard, because its into
credibilit' could not easily be maintained when pressures for large to
catch-up wage increases by major unions were so strong. for
inq
ProductivitY and Prices lo
Extraordinarily slow productivity growth in 1969 and 1970, though fe
anormal cyclical development, was protracted by the depressive 1ar
effect on real output growth of the sluggish response of wages and an
prices to demand restraint. Combined with continued large in- ne
creases in average hourly labor costs, this slow productivity growth in
produced extremely large increases in labor costs per unit of output.
Slack demand in product markets kept businesses from fully re- cy
couping the labor cost increases, with the result that profits de- (ol
dined markedly in both 1969 and 1970. Because unit labor cost w
increases were so large and accounted for such a large share of total in
costs, the decline in profits could not absorb them, and as a result re
large price increases continued. ca
There are several points worth noting here. Pressures for the prc
restoration of balance in the wage structure delayed the arrival of pr
smaller hourly labor cost increases. Thi delay, and its influence on
prices, generated a short-term real output growth path that was prd
lower than had been projected, reinforcing cyclically slow produc- risk
tivity growth and intensifying the pressure of costs on prices. The iza
prevalence of these cost pressures led to a "cost-push" diagnosis of ne
the malady and influenced the design of criteria for price adjust-j to
ments under the ensuing controls. Slow productivity growth pre- tin
eluded normal increases in real wage and income levels, thereby mi
intensifying pressures for large wage increases, while profits were Sic
squeezed to the point where they might be expected to increase di
significantly in a balanced recovery. O1L
The Outlook in Mid-1971
III.TI-
By mid-1971 conditions had been created for a period of better
economic performance. Better performance would require enough Tli
strength in aggregate demand to increase the pace of economic Au
activity and enough stability (or some continued decline) in infla- go
128 Kostersa e tion so that stronger demand would raise production and employ-
il ment levels and would not be dissipated in larger price increases.
md Prospects were favorable for improved wage and price performance
ced during the cyclical recovery.
rits On the labor cost side, the period had passed in which pressures
mild for large wage increases under new collective bargaining agree-
hat ments were most severe. Moreover, deferred wage increases built
its into existing contracts had stabilized. Deferred increases scheduled
rge to go into effect for 1972 were estimated to be slightly lower than
for 1971. While there were some contracts for which large wage
increases could be expected—coal miners, railroad workers, and
longshoremen—the collective bargaining calendar for 1972 showed
igh fewer workers scheduled to negotiate new agreements and fewer
ive large pattern-setting wage situations than there had been in 1970
nd and 1971. Moreover, large wage increases were not generally
in- necessary to attract or retain labor in view of the slack in labor
vth markets.
ut. Productivity growth prospects were also favorable during the
re- cyclical recovery in production that was under way. Roughly stable
(or even somewhat smaller) hourly labor cost increases combined
ost with more rapid productivity growth could reduce unit labor cost
tal increases, thereby making possible smaller price increases, rising
ult real wages and incomes, and some recovery in profits. Depressed
capacity utilization rates suggested ample room for expansion of
the production without resulting in supply conditions that would create
of pressure for price increases or generate shortages.14
on Thus, there was a reasonable prospect for a cyclical rise in
'as productivity growth that would permit real incomes and profits to
rise and relieve pressures for large wage and price increases. Real-
he ization of this outcome was not assured, however. The trend in
of newly negotiated wage increases might have been slow to respond
•st- to improved balance in the wage structure. Expectations of con-
e- tinued inflation and of possible direct action to restrain inflation
)y might have contributed to persistence in price increases. Expan-
re sionary aggregate demand policies might consequently have been
disproportionately translated into inflation rather than into real
• output growth.
III.THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
•er
The three elements of the New Economic Policy announced on
ic August 15, 1971, were (1) suspension of dollar convertibility into
:a- gold and imposition of an import surcharge to deal with the
Controlsand lnflaton: An Overview 129balance-of-payments problem, (2) requests to Congress for an in- ai
vestment tax credit and other tax changes to stimulate output and c
employment,and (3) imposition of a ninety-day freeze on prices,
wages, and rents. The New Economic Policy was motivated in large
part by high unemployment and was triggered by the international ei
situation—specifically an impending request for conversion of
about $2 billion into gold. The element of the New Economic
Policy with the most dramatic public impact was the freeze, even
though the freeze and the system of controls that followed were m
intended as a short-term complement to the other policy changes
and as a program to speed up the disinflation process already under
way.
t
Structureof the Controls P
c
There were major changes in the organizational structure and ad-
ministration of controls after the initial freeze, and these changes t
were widely regarded as marked changes in control policy. The
conceptual basis for the regulations applicable to price and wage
adjustments remained essentially unchanged, however, for most of
the economy during the two and a half years from November 1971
through April 1974, except for the second brief freeze in mid-1973.
Both regulations and procedures were modified over time, but the
initial wage standard was not formally changed, and the standards
for price adjustments generally permitted costs to be passed
through with profit margin limitations if prices were increased.
The broad outlines of the standards, procedures, and coverage of
the program are summarized in Table 2. The material set forth in
the table is amplified in the text by a discussion of some of the
salient features of the program's organization and administration.15
Some of the more detailed technical aspects of the rules and their
practical effects are considered in later sections.
PhaseII
TheCost of Living Council established the price goals for the
stabilization program, exercised authority over procedural issues Wages
and issues of coverage, coordinated policies and activities of the A.
other stabilization bodies, and retained planning and policy de-
velopment responsibility. The goal of reducing inflation to 2 to 3
percent by the end of 1972 was established to permit a gradual U
reductionin inflation (after an upsurge in the wake of the freeze) a
130 Kosters—
in- and to establish a context within which the Pay Board and Price
and Commission could develop and administer their standards. Raw
ices agricultural products were the major sector exempt from controls,
arge and coverage remained basically unchanged during the program,
onal except for the small-firm exemption in May 1972 and the decontrol
iof process in late 1973 and early 1974. A stabilization unit within the
)mic Internal Revenue Service was established to provide the field
even organization for the program and to conduct auditing and enforce-
Yere ment activities.16
ages Phase II began on November 14, 1971. One of its distinguishing
ider features was its heavy reliance on self-administration. The formal
coverage of the standards was broader than the reach of adminis-
trative intervention through formal review of individual wage and
price adjustments. A system of differentiated administrative pro-
cedures based primarily on the size of firms and employee units
I ad- was devised to reconcile broad coverage with limited administra-
ages tive involvement. Administration of the controls was influenced in
The several ways by the administration's desire to minimize intrusion
iage by a federal bureaucracy into price and wage decisions.
st of First, heavy reliance was placed on self-administration of the
[971 standards for smaller units; these units were subject only to pen-
973. odic review or a small probability of possible audit. In this respect,
the the regulations were administered in a way similar to the way the
ards personal income tax is administered. Second, the standards were
ssed designed to be generally applicable in order to permit self-adminis-
•I. tration, even though they were often difficult to apply to particular
e of cases and inevitably much too simple to cover the full range of corn-
h in plex situations in the economy. Third, the regulations were applied
• the to individual firms or employee units with relatively little con-
)fl.15 siderationfor industry price and cost patterns or for wage patterns
• kieir among industries, crafts, and occupations. These characterizations
apply with particular force for Phase II. A more varied and complex
approach was evolved beginning in 1973, reflecting changes in
market conditions and an increased recognition of the inappro-
priateness of such a simplified approach over time.
the
;ues Wages
the A general numerical standard for wage increases was established,
de- permitting compensation adjustments of up to 5.5 percent without
to 3 prior notification or review for all except the largest employee
lual units. Although criteria for exceptions were also provided, the wide
eze) applicability of the standard left little scope for adjustments in the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































swage structure. The intellectual roots of this approach can be traced
to the rationale for the guideposts of the early 1960s. Its public
acceptability as a credible approach owed much to widespread
public discussion ofthe potential contribution of a general numeri-
cal norm for wage increases.17 Moreover, it was compatible with an b
emphasis on self-administration. Under the wage standard, wages
and fringe benefits were treated as perfect substitutes. This treat-
ment was consistent with anemphasis on the cost implications of
pay adjustments, but it complicated the treatment of situations in
which large increases in fringe benefits were at issue.'8
While procedural differences in the treatment of wage adjust-
ments were formally based on employee-unit size, in practice the s
review and formal approval of pay adjustments was restricted
largely to increases that exceeded the general standard, with self-
administration generally applicable to increases within the limits of
the standard. Although the pay standard was widely viewed by the
public as setting a limit of 5.5 percent (later recognized to be 6.2
percent under provisions dealing with fringe benefits), the actual
standard and the way it was administered were more complex. Pay
increases of up to 7.0 percent were permitted for deferred wage in-
creases and as exceptions for tandem relationships, for catch-ups to
offset relatively small previous wage increases, and for retaining
h essential employees. Increases exceeding those explicitly per- T e
mittedby the regulations could be and were often permitted after
review of a particular case.'9
The regulations covering wage increases were initially de-
veloped and administered by a tripartite Pay Board.2° After four of
the five original labor representatives withdrew their participation
on March 22, 1972, the Pay Board was reconstituted as a public
body with seven members. While a measure of underlying labor
coopemtion and acquiescence was retained throughout Phase II, 4
organized labor's formal participation in the program was not re-
newed until the advent of Phase III. Labor participation at a policy
level instead of an operating level was obtained through establish-
ment of the Labor-Management Advisory Committee, and a sig-
nificant impetus for restructuring the program in Phase III came
from a recognition that a participatory and cooperative role for labor
was essential for any program of wage and price restraint.
Prices
The pricing standards for Phase II were developed and admin-
istered by the Price Commission.2' Price adjustments were per-
134 Kosters Lmitted if there had been cost increases, subject to the provision
that these price increases did not lead to profit margins that ex-
ceeded limits established by a base period. Both the cost pass-
through and profit margin rules were applied on a finn-by-firm
basis, an approach that made self-administration feasible. All firms
except the largest could apply the regulations themselves in mak-
ing price adjustments. The largest firms had to submit requests for
price increases and secure approval before those increases could be
put into effect. For retail and wholesale operations the cost pass-
through regulations permitted maintenance of percentage markups
on the cost of merchandise only, while in the manufacturing and
services sectors increases in all allowable costs incurred could be
passed through on a percentage basis. Price increases to reflect
increased merchandise costs for retailers and wholesalers were
self-administered even in the largest firms, as were price adjust-
ments for producers of products for which major input costs were
exceptionally volatile, for example, in meat-packing operations.
More specialized rules, also based on cost pass-through concepts,
were developed for health services, insurance, and rents.
TheShift to Phase III
Therestructuring of the stabilization program for Phase II! was
designed to provide a way station out of controls and to secure
renewed cooperation in a program of wage and price restraint.
From the time they were initially imposed, wage and price controls
had been viewed by the administration as a short-term approach. It
was repeatedly announced that the goal was to terminate controls
as soon as this was feasible.22 Phase III was intended to be a transi-
tional stage in the process of removing mandatory wage and price
controls. At the same time it was intended to contribute toward
continued restraint. One element in this restraint involved enlist-
ing the cooperation of organized labor during a year in which the
bargaining calendar was heavy and a resurgence of large wage in-
creases was regarded as likely by many observers.23 The other
major element involved special attention to sectors in which con-
tinuing inflation problems were regarded as most severe, not only
through the application of specialized controls mechanisms but
also by an emphasis on federal policies influencing supply, particu-
larly in the agricultural sector. How much Phase III contributed to
restraint is a complex problem, but it clearly failed as an attempt to
remove controls. Its demise came with the imposition of a new










rprice freeze after five months of retreat from flexibility and self-
administration.
The major organizational changes in Phase III were the termi-
nation of the Pay Board and Price Commission and the assumption
of operational responsibility by the Cost of Living Council.24 New r
committee structures were formed for the food and health sectors
14
(an advisory committee with private sector representatives and a
government áommittee to review federal policies influencing infla-
tion for each sector) while the Construction Industry Stabilization
Committee continued to operate. Standards and procedures in
these three sectors continued basically unchanged from what they
were in Phase IL
For other sectors of the economy, the major substantive changes
in the program were a modification of the price standard and a
change in the administration of price and wage standards. The
price standard was modified so as to reduce the constraining influ-
ence of profit margin limitations; the profit margin limitation was
removed for firms with cost-justified price increases averaging less
than 1.5 percent, and the base period that could be used in comput-
ing the profit margin limits was extended forward to the most re-
cently completed fiscal year. Prenotification requirements for
wages and prices were terminated, although quarterly reports were
required for the largest units. Moreover, broad conformance with
the standards was required instead of detailed technical corn-
pliance with regulations, since detailed technical compliance
would need to be accompanied by increasing complexity and detail
in the regulations and carefully spelled-out rulings for particular
situations. These changes toward "voluntary" and "self-admin-
istered" standards were perhaps of most substantive importance
and generated most public interest.
On the wage side, John Dunlop, the new director, gave as one of
his guiding principles the February 26, 1973, statement by the
Labor-Management Advisory Committee that "no single standard
or wage settlement can be equally applicable at one time to all
parties in an economy so large, decentralized, and dynamic."25 d
Although the change in emphasis was widely viewed as a repudia-
tion of the wage norm for Phase II, the main practical effect of the
change was to give more explicit attention to wage-structure rela-
tionships and patterns but not to raise the average level of wage
settlements.26 On the price side, one of the most revealing indica-
tions of the direction in which the program was oriented was the
clause in the general price standard permitting adjustments that
would otherwise exceed the standards "as necessary for efficient
136 Kosters —allocation of resources or to maintain adequate levels of supply."
Apart from the unwinding of delays that had previously been intro-
duced by prenotification requirements, there was little formal
change in the substance of the regulations, however, because the
regulations, computation procedures, and rulings developed in
Phase II were to be used in self-administering adjustments in both
a prices and wages.
The development and introduction of Phase III had been prem-
ised on a view of the price outlook that was far more optimistic than
the inflation trend that actually emerged—a failure in predictio'
y that was shared by most professional forecasters.27 It was also based
on the view that the combination of substantive economic con-
ditions in the labor market (particularly the restoration of improved
a balance in the wage structure) and the cooperative involvement of
e organized labor in a program to maintain stability made wage re-
straint during the year a realistic and achievable objective. Wage
increases during 1973 were reasonably consistent with prospects
s as they were viewed in late 1972, in spite of price increases much
larger than had been projected.28
The surge in food prices, led by large increases in meat prices,
began in December 1972. By the end of March, ceilings were im-
e posed on meat prices, based on the expectation at that time that
h food prices would rise less rapidly later in the year and the view
that temporary meat price ceilings could therefore help to maintain
restraint in wage settlements. At the beginning of May, the accel-
ii eration of price increases had become much broader, and limited
prenotification was reinstituted to introduce some delay in the pass-
through of increased costs of a wide range of basic materials. By
e June the earlier optimism regarding food prices later in the year
was no longer tenable, and accelerating price increases had become
more pervasive throughout the economy. The widespread per-
e ception that Phase III was a failure and that a return to a controls
I structure similar to Phase II could contribute to renewed stability
undoubtedly influenced public and congressional attitudes. The
decision to terminate Phase III was the policy response.
- Thesharp acceleration of price increases in 1973 coincided
closely in timing with the shift to Phase III but owed little to
modifications in the standards of Phase II and their administration.
e Perhaps the strongest evidence that the shift to Phase III was not
responsible for the acceleration is that the acceleration began in
e food prices, and food prices remained the major contributor to
t higher living costs throughout most of the year, even though
mandatory controls on food prices, including prenotification re-
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 137quirements, were retained throughout Phase III. Moreover, price st
increases in most other sectors were supported by increased costs p
(according to the quarterly reports covering the period), most of the
largest price increases were within the limits permissible during tl.
Phase II, and profits and cost data from other sources show no sharp
break with earlier trends. Taken together, this evidence indicates 1a
that the problem was not a failure of compliance with the cost pass- d4
through regulations that had been in force since the program began.
Consequently, the principal action tool of Phase III, the "stick in
the closet" to induce compliance, turned out to be highly inappro- e




FreezeII and Phase IV
S
n
The public dialogue on inflation during the first half of 1973 was d
dominated by discussion of controls and their apparent lack of
stringency. In this climate public and congressional pressures rose a
for strong direct action. A price freeze announced June 13, 1973, 1
was a response to these pressures, despite economic judgments that f
its disruptive consequences would outweigh its contribution to c
price stability. The duration of the freeze was not to exceed sixty
days; it covered only prices, with wages to be adjusted under exist-
ing standards and procedures; and it was to be followed by a p
stringent program of controls. It was lifted on a sectoral basis as
sectors were placed under regulations similar to but somewhat
S
morestringent than those of Phase II, beginning July 18 with the
food sector, where market disruptions were most severe.29 The
introduction of Phase' IV was also accompanied by announced in- dl
tentions to decontrol on a sector-by-sector basis. s
The standards of Phase IV generally permitted pass-through of ni
increased costs, although there was more differentiation among h4
sectors in the application of this principle. Costs could only be
passed through on a dollar-for-dollar basis, however, which had not fd
been the case in Phase II, and prices ma number of sectors were f
significantly limited because further increases in prices were re- b.
stricted to increases in costs occurring since the last quarter of 1972 s
that had not been reflected by price increases during that period. i1'
Situations in which price ceilings held prices below market levels dl
were far more numerous in Phase IV than in earlier phases. How-
ever, this was mostly attributable to changes in both domestic and
world market conditions, to more use of delays in sectors such as
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steel,and to specialized sectoral regulations, particularly in the
petroleum, health, and food sectors.
The difference in market conditions between 1972 and 1973 and
the extent to which the actual trend of consumer prices during the
year would depend on decisions and developments wholly unre-
lated to controls is illustrated by two areas singled out by the Presi-
dent in his announcement of the freeze—gasoline and food prices.
In the announcement, he referred to strong export demand for farm
products, and requested more flexible authority from Congress for
export controls. Comprehensive export controls for farm products
were not imposed because it was recognized that their imposition
would seriously compromise other goals. However, stabilization of
food prices at retail was inconsistent with a dramatically rising cost
structure that reflected the rise of raw farm product prices on world
markets. While the full implications of rising crude oil prices were
not evident at this time, prices on world markets were rising above
domestic levels well before the embargo, and the U.S. economy
was dependent on supplies from foreign sources. Controls could
and did play a role in keeping petroleum product prices below
levels they would otherwise have reached, but there was no escape
from the significant price consequences of the tripling of imported
crude oil prices late in the year.
Although the Phase IV regulations were substantively similar for
most sectors to those that had been in force in Phase II, the general
policy approach of the former differed in two fundamental ways.
There was less reluctance to tolerate temporary dislocations result-
ing from the controls, such as dispersion in domestic prices and
instances of domestic prices below prices on international markets.
These conditions had been mainly confined to the lumber industry
during Phase II. Though they were more prevalent and more
severe during Phase IV, remedial adjustments were usually not
made unless it could be demonstrated that these conditions would
have seriously harmful and costly effects. At the same time, initia-
tives for the selective decontrol of individual sectors were carried
forward, gradually at first and at a faster pace in early 1974. Criteria
for decontrol and its timing were never publicly set forth in detail,
but they frequently involved commitments from industry repre-
sentatives with respect to prices, investment, or improvement of
industrial relations practices.3° This approach helped to avoid a
disorderly retreat from controls through administrative breakdown
or overwhelming pressures from litigation or from congressional
initiatives. At the same time the continuing pinch of controls kept
counterpressures against decontrol from building.
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Theelements of the decontrol process are not easily summarized, stab
but it was oriented toward an orderly and cumulative extrication thel
from controls. One of its guiding principles was a general poiicy of pri
decontrolling both wages and prices in each case. The somewhat
paradoxical role played by price prospects is illustrated on the one
hand by decontrol of lumber when Phase IV began because prices cyc3
weredeclining, and on the other by early decontrol of fertilizer in ne
spite of large price increasesbecause decontrol would contribute to bod
increased domestic supply. The administration's position on exten- of!
sion of the stabilization authority was also designed to facilitate
continued decontrol while retaining enough flexibility to promote in
effective dialogue among private-sector interests, Congress, and th
the executive branch. By April 30, 1974, more than half of the por- av
tion of the economy covered when Phase IV began had been de- ra
controlled, with only 12 percent of the consumer price index re- 19
maining under control as against 44 percent before decontrol sh
began. Congressional attitudes had changed so markedly from the pr
previous year that no action was taken to provide for the limited
mandatory authority requested by the administration, or even to pr
establish a basis for monitoring the private sector and for analysis ea
and policy review within the executive branch explicitly directed Tl-{




IV.CONTROLS AND THE ECONOMY
Theeffects of controls on the economy, and the effects of develop-
1fl
mentsin the economy on controls, can be approached from various fo points of view. Each approach can give insight into some aspect of
the relation between stabilization actions and economic goals, but tin
regardless of the approach the insights cannot be easily summed up re
to provide an overall assessment. Careful analyses using different ra
approaches have supported different conclusions on the influenceI
ofcontrols on wages, prices, and profits during the program.32 In fa
this section, the stabilization program is examined primarily from
the point of view of overall consistency of performance with the
stabilization rules. la!
tie.
GeneralPerformance of the Economy
de
Duringthe period from 1971 through 1974, wage and price controls ofi
were only one component of economic policy, and improved price en
140 Kostersstability was only one of several goals of that policy. Controls and
their administration were regarded as closely linked with the high-
f priority goal of a vigorous cyclical recovery in 1972. Their influence
t on this goal was initially uncertain and given close attention.33
That controls did not interfere with a resumption of strong
s cyclical growth and may have contributed to it is an assertion that
needs little qualification. Real output rose by about 6 percent in
both 1972 and 1973 compared to 3.3 percent in 1971, the first year
- ofthe recovery. Although the unemployment rate declined only
e gradually throughout 1972 and 1973, increases in employment and
in the labor force were unusually large. Employment rose by more
:1 than 2.5 million workers in 1972 and 1973 compared to an annual
average rise of 1.3 million between 1959 and 1969. The period of
rapid increase in output that extended through the first quarter of
1973 was accompanied by strong cyclical productivity growth, a
1 short-term developmen,t that contributed heavily to the favorable
e price, income, and profits trends of 1972.
:1 Pressures of labor costs on prices were relieved by the surge in
o productivity growth, permitting unusually large increases in real
s earnings with a somewhat less rapid rise in wage rates than earlier.
d The large increases in output were accompanied by rising profits
and some rise in the profits share, although the employee com-
pensation share remained unusually high during the cyclical ex-
pansion. These conditions during 1972 help to account for the
degree of public acceptance of controls at that time and for the
underlying cooperation of organized labor evidenced by the low
incidence of work stoppages.
In 1973 price increases accelerated sharply, at the outset mostly
IS for food, and the acceleration in inflation at the consumer level was
heavily concentrated in food throughout most of the year. A con-
• t tinuation of relatively moderate wage increases led to a decline in
p real earnings, even though labor costs per unit of output rose more
rapidly when productivity increases tapered off during 1973. Most
e of the acceleration in price increases, however, can be traced to
factors other than larger increases in unit labor costs.
The price surge of 1973 was dominated by developments that
•e were largely outside of the aggregative domestic cost and price re-
lationships that have received most attention in formulating projec-
tions of price performance. The main exogenous elements were the
decline in world food supply, the further devaluation and subse-
quent slide in the value of the dollar, the strength and coincidence
Is of the boom in most large industrial countries, and by fall, the oil
embargo and action taken by the international cartel to raise prices.
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 141In addition, a number of basic materials industries were operating
at capacityproduction levels, though this was belatedly recognized.
While the inflation was supported by a period of rapid monetary
expansion, these developments through their influence on do-
mestic supply and prices had a major impact on short-term inflation.
It is possible, however, that delays in price increases induced by
the controls contributed to the persistence of overly expansionary
policies by delaying the recognition of inflationary pressures in
1972 and early 1973.
Wages
Wage increases, as measured by adjusted average hourly earnings,
were somewhat smaller in percent terms in 1972 and 1973 than in
the preceding four years. The decline in new first-year wage in-
creases under major collective bargaining agreements was much
more pronounced. In manufacturing, for example, the average in-
crease declined from 10.9 percent in 1971 to 6.6 percent in 1972.
The decline in construction wage increases began in 1971, coinci-
dent with the introduction of controls, and new first-year increases
declined from an average of 17.6 percent in 1970 to 5.0 percent in
1973. While this shows that wages increased less rapidly under
controls than before, the extent to which the slowdown was at-
tributable to the controls is not clear.
Wage-structure developments in the period immediately before
institution of controls had created conditions favorable for achiev-
ing smaller wage increases by 1972. Deferred wage increases
scheduled for 1972 were somewhat lower on average than those for
1971, and most workers with contracts expiring in 1972 had re-
ceived relatively large increases during the term of their contracts.
Their position in the wage structure compared to relative positions
of other unionized workers had not deteriorated significantly.
Moreover, workers in nonunion manufacturing establishments re-
ceived smaller wage increases in 1970 and 1971 than those in union
establishments. Thus, the wages of most workers with wage agree-
ments scheduled to expire in 1972 were in better balance with
wages of other workers in the economy than had been the wages of
those covered by contracts expiring in 1970 or 1971. Moreover, the
shift from acceleration to a slight deceleration in consumer price
increases meant that an improved balance between wage and price



















tliWage-structure conditions in 1972 also pointed to the prospect of
d. moderate settlements in 1973. The collective bargaining calendar
ry was dominated by a few large contract situations, and the available
.0- evidence indicated that wages under most of the largest contracts
expiring in 1973 had increased during the term of these contracts at
least as rapidly as had the wages of the average worker. This pattern
is illustrated in the tabulation below, which shows the percent in-
in crease in average hourly earnings in three industries in which a
high proportion of workers were covered by long-term contracts




in Rubber 6.5 7.6
Autos 12.3 8.1
Trucking 13.3 10.8
2. The lack of evidence of deterioration in the relative wage positions
of workers under contracts expiring in 1973 is in striking contrast to
es the pattern in the late 1960s (see Table 1). Moreover, the slower
in price increases of 1972 permitted unusually large real wage gains
er for most wcrkers, including those with contracts expiring in 1973.
at- The wage situation in construction and some other sectorswas
more complex. First-year wage increases in construction, after ac-
re celerating throughout the late 1960s, reached an average rate of
increase of over 17 percent in 1970, and normal wage patterns
es within the industry were severely disrupted. The extremely large
or wage increases in construction were considered by many observers
to be creating wage-structure pressures in other sectors, as workers
ts. with comparable skills sought comparable wage increases. The dis-
• .flS orderly wage-structure conditions that emerged, both within the
Y. construction sector and for wages of workers in other sectors with
e- skills similar to those of construction workers, do not lend them-
selves to a simple interpretation. They represented developments
e- more complex than simple restoration of a balance in relative wages,
th that had been disrupted primarily through inflation. Consequently,
of there is no strong basis for confidence that the pattern of leap-
ie frogging and catch-up would have been broken in the absence of
controls. The timing and magnitude of the decline in new wage in-
Ce creases in construction in 1971 and 1972 provide strong circum-
in stantial evidence that a significant influence should be attributed to
the controls in that sector.34 Moreover, smaller wage increases in
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constructionunder wage controls may have contributed indirectly (
towage stabilization in other sectors. Since construction wage
levels were already relatively high, it would have been extremely
difficult to achieve smaller wage increases in other sectors and a
restoration of more normal wage-structure patterns in the absence
of a sharp reduction in construction wage increases.
For most sectors, the fact that new wage increases under collec-
tive bargaining agreements in 1972 and 1973 were smaller than
those in 1970 and 1971 fits the pattern expected on the basis of
wage structuraldevelopments. Much of the decline in wage in-
creases could have been the result of factors other than the con-
trols, although controls may have facilitated a more rapid reali-
zation of smaller wage increases. Wage-structure developments
undoubtedly contributed to the acquiescence of organized labor in
settlements with smaller wage increases in 1972 and 1973 than had
been obtained earlier. The fact that the Pay Board approved higher
wage increases in the union than in the nonunion sector, the con-
centration of wage cutbacks in the union sector, a declining differ-
ential between wage increases for union and nonunion workers in
manufacturing in 1972, and the reduced dispersion in the size of
new wage settlements in 1972 and 1973 are all consistent with the
view that an important role should be attributed to changing wage-
structure conditions.
Assessment of the contribution of controls to the reduction in the
size of new wage increases under collective bargaining agreements
in 1972 and 1973 is complicated by the influence of wage structural
changes. In Table 3, data on the distribution of wage increases
under major agreements show a pronounced reduction in the pro-
portion of increases that exceeded 8 and 10 percent in 1972 and
1973. Although changes in wage-structure conditions provided
grounds for expecting fewer very large wage increases after 1971,
wage controls may have helped to ensure that restoration of wage-
structure balance was accompanied by a reduction in average wage
increases.
It has often 'been suggested that setting a standard or guideline
as a ceiling for wage increases also tends to set a floor.35 The evi-
dence from the data in Table 3 is mixed. A larger proportion of
settlements with wage increases below 5 and 6 percent occurred
during the two years of controls than during the preceding two
years. However, by 1973, wage increases were also far more heavily
concentrated in the 5 to 6 percent range than they had been previ-
ously. Since the wage standard was implemented for a period too



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































esince little confidence can be placed in projections of the propor- pr
tion of small wage increases that was most likely in the absence of
controls, these data provide at best only weak evidence on this
issue. exa Another issue that has undergone considerable debate is the dw
effectiveness of a simple numerical guideline or standard for wage ba
stabilization. The standards and computational procedures estab-
r
thi4
lished during Phase II were neither strongly reaffirmed nor ex- coii
plicitly disavowed in 1973; they were, however, used along with pr other criteria under an approach in which the idea of a single m
standard applicable to all wage situations was explicitly rejected.
These data indicate, however, that the dispersion in actual wage
settlements was smaller in 1973 and average increases were an
smaller, both for all industries and within manufacturing, than in pr
1972. The standards were apparently administered more flexibly in m
1972 than was generally recognized, and they resulted in lower
average increases in 1973 than in 1972, in spite of the announced re
intentions to administer them with more flexibility. ra
m
Prices fr
p The goal of a 2 to 3 percent rate of inflation by the end of 1972 was
established when controls were introduced. The desired reduction di
was considerably below the 6 percent increase in consumer prices set that took place during 1969. However, the upper range of the goal w
was a modest target compared to the 3.6 percent rate of increase a1
duringthe first eight months of 1971. The belief that the goal was
within reach was bolstered by the fact that consumer prices were
increasing at about a 3 percent rate in mid-1972. More rapid in-
creases in food prices in late 1972, reflected most strongly in the ac
wholesale price index, pointed toward a temporary acceleration in le;
consumer price inflation. But since the acceleration was mainly th
limited to the farm and food sector, the acceleration in inflation
from this source could potentially be reversed relatively quickly
by appropriately expansionary farm policies if crop conditions were
favorable.
This prospect was shattered by the size and persistence of the
increases in farm and food prices, along with the unexpected
emergence of tight markets and sharp price increases in several th
other critical sectors. Thus, the initial promise of progress toward ol
renewed price stability, nurtured in part by the initial apparent suc-
cess of Phase II, was followed by a surge in inflation to almost un-
146 Kostersprecedented rates in spite of efforts to restructure the controls to
contain it.
Evaluation of the influence of controls on prices is facilitated by
examining the sectoral incidence of inflation and of its acceleration
during the period. The pass-through of increased costs formed the
basis for price adjustments, and in several sectors prices of inputs
that accounted for a major share of total costs were exempt from
controls. As a result, in those sectors control was exerted only on
processing and distribution markups, and prices could rise dra-
matically under the stabilization rules in contrast to other sectors in
which most of the major inputs were domestically produced and
subject to controls. Moreover, increases in prices of major inputs
and pass-through of those increased input costs to higher product
prices were generally permitted when demand conditions in the
marketplace supported them. This approach was necessary in view
of the limited supplementary role intended for controls and the
reluctance to take complementary measures such as subsidization,
rationing, or export controls that would have been necessary if a
more ambitious role had been assigned to controls.
During 1972, disproportionate contributions to inflation came
from the food component of the consumer price index and the farm
products and processed food and feeds component of the wholesale
price index (Table 4). Increases in wholesale industrial prices were
disproportionately concentrated in lumber and hides. In all of these
sectors, major inputs were exempt from controls. Demand pressures
were transmitted throughout the processing and distribution chain,
a process that kept cost increases, except for costs of producing
exempt products, roughly consistent with product price increases.
In the first three quarters of 1973, food prices rose rapidly, and rapid
increases in exempt farm product prices accounted for much of their
acceleration. In the last part of the year, the contribution of petro-
leum and energy prices to inflation was extraordinarily large, even
though petroleum and other energy products represented only
small components of the indexes.36 In both sectors, increased costs
were quickly reflected in higher consumer prices because the time
spent in the production and distribution chain is relatively short.
While the prices of both farm products and petroleum products
were stronglyinfluenced by developmentsininternational
markets, pressure on domestic prices came from export demand in
the case of farm products and from rising import prices in the case
of petroleum products.
The strength of demand in both domestic and foreign markets
and the devaluation of the dollar combined to support higher prices





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8for a widening range of basic materials, These higher prices were -rABL
initially reflected primarily in the wholesale price index. In 1973,
prices of basic and partially processed materials, which constituted
30 percent of the industrial component of wholesale prices, ac-
counted for about 75 percent of the overall increase in industrial Indus
prices. These increased costs for processors and distributors were
reflected in the latter part of 1973 and in 1974 by price increases for Whole
other commodities in the wholesale price index and higher con- i-iioditi
sumer prices.
There was considerable scope for price increases within the
limits of the stabilization rules at the beginning of 1973. The extent
to which the prices of commodities in the industrial component of C
the wholesale price index could rise during 1972 and early 1973 pr
before reaching levels authorized from the outset of the freeze in
August 1971 is shown in Table 5. Much of the room for price \'Ietals increases was concentrated in the three sectors shown separately,
and the amount of room left was rapidly shrinking in the first part of
1973. The tabulation does not take into account, however, the addi- M
tional authority for price increases .granted by the Price Comm is- (1
sion during Phase II. Many companies in each of these sectors, and
most of the major companies in the chemical industry, were au-
thorized under term-limit pricing agreements to raise prices by an Al
average of 1.8 to 2.0 percent above the stated levels.37 By November (4
1972, after submission of prenotification requests, price increases
averaging between 3 and 4 percent had been approved covering a
large proportion of the sales of large firms in each of these sectors. SOURO
Much of the acceleration in wholesale price increases in early 1973 NO
represented increases toward previously authorized levels.
To assess the extent to which price increases during the program
were consistent with the cost pass-through rules, actual cost and
price trends can be compared. Because labor costs constitute a
major share of value added, it is instructive to compare increases in aNumb
unitlabor costs and in the implicit price deflator for the private
________
nonfarmand nonfinancial corporate sectors during the period of
controls. There was an unusually close correspondence between c
priceand unit labor cost increases during 1972; price increases ii
were smaller than unit labor cost increases in 1973.28 The close
correspondence during 1972 and early 1973 is particularly striking
because in the typical cyclical pattern, at least prior to 1968, price p
increases exceeded unit labor cost increases when demand and out-
put increases were large. To adjust for this cyclical influence, pre- I C
dicteddifferences for the period beginning with the last quarter of ti
1971 were developed on the basis of a regression fitted to the pre- a
150
JKostersVABLE 5 Wholesale Prices of Industrial Products below
Initial Price Ceilings: Number of Items and
ci Impact, Selected Months, December 1971-April 1973
Industrial Commodities below Dec. June Dec. April
Apparent Price Ceilings 1971 1972 1972 1973
)r Wholesale industiial corn-
odities (73.162)a
Numberof commodities
below ceilings 553 496 473 366
Impact of rise to ceilings1.82% 1.54% 1.46% 0.90% lt Chemicals and allied
products (5.716)a
'3 Number 69 78 78 69
fl Impact 0.22% 0.21% 0.21% 0.17%
Aetals and metal products (13,439)a
Number 127 113 109 68
Impact 0.74% 0.65% 0.62% 0.25%
i- Machineiy and equipment
(12.280)a
Number 138 142 141 120
Impact 0.32% 0.34% 0.34% 0.26%
All other components
(41.627)a
er Number 219 163 145 109
CS Impact 0.54% 0.34% 0.29% 0.22%
s. SOURCE:U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
73 NOTE:Apparent initial price ceilings are defined as the highest prices of four months:
May 1970, June 1970, July 1971, and August 1971. Prices in these months
were chosen to approximate the alternate price ceilings of May 25, 1970, in
m the legislation and those of the base period for the freeze in the thirty days
prior to August 15, 1971. Measures of the impact of a rise in prices to apparent
initial ceiling levels are estimates of the percent impact of the wholesale price a index on the industrial commodities component.
•.Ln aNumbersin parentheses reflect relative importance in December 1971.
:e
ceding period and including the unemployment rate and changes
in real output.39 The predicted differences are compared with ac-
tual differences in figures 1 and 2, and the charts show substantially
smaller price increases relative to unit labor cost increases than
predicted throughout the period of controls. Those data strongly
suggest that price increases conformed more closely to unit labor
e- cost increases under the cost pass-through rules of the controls
of than would have been expected at that stage of the cycle in the



























FIGURE 1Predicted and Actual Changes in Prices and Unit Labor j'rofits
Costs of Nonfinancial Corporations, 1959-1973







SOURCE:Bureau of Labor Statistics.
a Quarterly percent change in prices minus percent change in unit labor costs measured from
four quarters earlier.
FIGURE 2 Predicted and Actual Changes in Prices and Unit Labor
Costs in the Private Nonfarm Sector, 1950-1973







SOURCE:Bureau of Labor Statistics.
aQuarterly percent change in prices minus percent change in unit labor costs measured from
four quarters earlier.
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Corporate profits rose by an average of 15 percent per year from
1970 to 1973, after declining by an average of 12 percent per year
from 1968 to 1970. The pretax corporate profits share rose from 11.8
percent in 1970 to 13.4 percent in 1972 and 13.6 percent in 1973,
but remained well below its average level of 17.4 percent during
the 1960s. Profits are highly cyclical, and it is difficult to compare
their actual performance in 1971—1973 with performance that
would normally be expected in a cyclical recovery. It is instruc-
tive, however, to analyze the extent to which profit trends during
this period were consistent with the stabilization rules and to ex-
amine the relationship between price and profit margin changes.
In the simplest analytic framework, the cost pass-through rules
for price adjustments suggest that percent profit margins on sales
should remain constant with percent cost pass-through and declfne
with dollar-for-dollar pass-through of costs. This analytic frame-
work, however, does not take into account possibilities for input
substitution, short-term productivity changes that differ from those
m applied during the program, changes in product mix, and the effect
of increased volume on fixed costs per unit of output. Thus, actual
profit margins could rise within the framework of the stabilization
regulations.
The consistency of profit performance with the stabilization regu-
lations is explored in tables 6, 7, and 8, along with the influence of
alternative pricing rules and short-term productivity changes on
profits and prices. The analysis is focused mainly on profits, value
added, and implicit price defiators for nonfinancial corporations
because the coverage and procedural requirements of the controls
were concentrated on large firms and the data are readily available.
These data permit some judgments to be made about the behavior
of costs, prices, and profits in relation to the regulations. The period
over which the analysis is made begins with the first quarter of 1971
because price increases under the stabilization regulations could
not be linked to cost increases that occurred earlier than the be-
ginning of 1971.
The predominant share of the increase in profits during the entire
period from the first quarter of 1971 to the second quarter of 1974
can be attributed to the increase in the current dollar value of out-
3 putduring that period rather than to a rise in percent profit margins.
Of the $5.4 billion cumulative increase in profits for nonfinancial
rn corporations during the second quarter of 1974 (column 1, Table 6),
$5.2 billion was required to maintain a constant percent profit mar-
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LTABLE 6 Profits and Profit Margins of Nonfinancial Corporations,
Quarterly and Cumulative Changes from 19711 through
1974.11
Calculated Change in Profits
Diff. be-
Maintenance Departuretween Constant
Actual of Constantfrom Constant Percent
Change Percent Percent and Constant
in Profits Margin Margin Dollar Margin5
Year and
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quarter Quarterly Change in Profits (billions of dollars, annual rates)
197111 2.6 1.1 1.5 0.5
ill 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3
Iv 0.5 1.2 —0.7 0.1
19721 5.1 2.3 2.8 0.6
II 2.3 1.8 0.5 0.2
III 2,3 1.2 1.1 0.2
IV 5.7 2.4 3.3 0.5
19731 2.9 2.8 0.1 0.6
II 0.4 1.8 —1.4 0.9
III —0.5 1.3 —1.8 0.9
IV —0.2 1.7 —1.9 1.4
19741 —4.1 0.5 —4.6 2.1
11 3.2 1.9 1.3 2.2
Cumulative
Periods Cumulative Change in Prof itSb (billions of dollars)
19711V 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.2
19721V 4.9 2.7 2.3 0.6
19731V 5.6 4.6 1.0 1.5
197411 5.4 5.2 0.2 2.6
SOURCE: Computed from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis.
NOTE:Profits are measured before taxes and include the inventoiy valuation ad-
justment; output is measured in terms of value added as reported in the
national income accounts.
aThjs increment to profits is calculated as the difference between the increase in profits
that would be sufficient to maintain constant percent profit margins and the increase
that would be sufficient only to keep profits per unit of real output constant. It represents
the amount by which profits would need to be augmented to compensate for inflation in
order to avoid a reduction in the profits share.
5Cumtilative profit changes are smaller than the sum of quarterly changes by approxi-
mately a factor.of four, since quarterly changes are expressed at annual rates, and quar-
terly changes may not sum to totals of four times cumulative changes because of round-
ing. Cumulative totals for components may also differ because they weie calculated on







lJgin (column 2, Table 6). About half of this component of profits re-
flected rising prices (column 4, Table 6) with the other half reflect-
ing increased real output. Only a tiny fraction of the increase in
profits in this quarter was accounted for by an increase in percent
profit margins (column 3, Table 6). Also by the second quarter of
1974, the profits share of gross product originating in nonfinancial
corporations was only 10.5 percent, compared to an average of 15.2
percent during the 1960s.
There was a great deal of variation in overall changes in profits
during the period, however, and in the extent to which such
changes reflected changes in percent profit margins. By the end of
1972, wider percent profit margins accounted for nearly as much of
the cumulative increase in profits as the increased value of output
at constant percent margins. On the other hand, by the second
quarter of 1974 wider margins accounted for only a minute share.
of the cumulative increase in profits (columns 2 and 3, Table 6).
The extent to which profits increase consistent with the objective
of maintaining constant percent margins reflected rising real output
or rising prices also shifted markedly during the period. The calcu-
lated increment to profits resulting from the difference between
constant percent and constant dollar profit margins was very small
through 1972 ($0.6 billion out of $2.7 billion), but it increased
sharply when prices were rising more rapidly during 1973 and early
1974. By the second quarter of 1974, half of the profits increase
associated with maintaining constant percent margins was ac-
counted for by higher prices instead of by increased real output.
The difference between constant percent and constant dollar
profit margins per unit of real output corresponds closely in concept
to the difference between price adjustments to reflect percent pass-
through or price adjustments toreflect dollar-for-dollar pass-
— throughof increased costs. Because these calculations (column 4,
Table 6) are based on value-added measures of real output, the
calculated difference in profits understates the impact on profits of
I- the difference in cost pass-through concepts. The impact of the
Le differencebetween percentage and dollar-for-dollar cost pass-
ts throughmay be understated by approximately a factor of two when
the costs of materials inputs are rising at about the same rare as
costs of the value-added component of prices.
Another limitation in the applicability of these aggregative corn-
parisons of percent and dollar-for-dollar cost pass-throughs is that
the cost pass-through regulations were applied in different ways for
particular sectors. For example, the retail and wholesale sectors
were permitted to apply percent markups to the cost of merchan-
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 155TABLE' Profit Margins and Changes in Output per Man-Hour
of Nonfinancial Corporations, 19711-1974.11
Duff, between Duff.
Percent Trend Rate and
Change in Short-Term
Output perOutput per Man-
Man-HourHour Changea
(1) (2)






Year and Quarterly Output per
Quarterly Calculated
Increments to Profits
Quarter Man-Hour (billions of dollars, annual rates)
197111 0.9 0.1 0.3 1.5
III 1.6 0.8 2.9 0.4
IV 0.7 —0.1 —0.4 —0.7
1972! 1.8 1.0 3.8 2.8
II 1.0 0.2 0.9 0.5
III 1.1 0.3 1.2 1.1
IV 1.1 0.3 1.2 3.3
1973! 2.0 1.2 5.0 0.1
II 0.2 —0.6 —2.8 —1.4
III 0.2 —0.6 —2.9 —1.8
IV —0.6 —1.5 —6.7 —1.9
1974! —1.4 —2.2 —10.3 —4.6








19711V 3.2 0.8 0,7 0.3
19721V 8.3 2.6 2.5 2.3
19731V 9.9 1.0 0.6 1.0
197411 8.9 —1.6 —2.5 0.2
SOURCE: Computed from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, and Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
aThe trend rate of increase in output per man-hour was calculated as the compound
quarterly rate of increase from 1958 through 1969, the period used by the Price Com-
mission for developing rates of productivity growth to be applied in estimating net in-
creases in labor costs. The quarterly trend rate for the nonfinancial corporate sector was
0.8 percent (3.2 percent annually).
5lncrements to profits attributed to the difference between short-term and trend rates of
change in output per man-hour are calculated by applying the differential in output per
man-hour changes to the compensation share of value added in the nonfinancial corpo-
rate sector.
CFromcolumn 3, Table 6.
dQuarterly changes may not sum to cumulative totals because of rounding.



















basis adise throughout this period as well as in earlier stabilization pro-
grams. In certain sectors, such as meat packing, where prices of
major inputs were highly volatile, price adjustments were per-
milled during the entire period only to reflect dollar-for-dollar pass-
through of major input costs. It is difficult to be precise about the
quantitative influence of constant percent or constant dollar profit
margins, but it is worth noting that the impact of the difference be-
tween percent and dollar-for-dollar cost pass-through is dispropor-
tionately larger for profit margins than for price changes. The in-
$ crement to profits necessary to maintain constant percent profit
margins, by reflecting the rise in prices at a given output level,
accounted for about 50 percent of the increase in profits over the
entire period but only 1.5 percentage points of the 15 percent rise
in prices (columns 1 and 4, Table 8, below).
Short-term changes in output per man-hour resulted in changes
in the relationship between revenues and costs that could be re-
flected in changes in profit margins within the framework of the
stabilization regulations. This source of short-term variation in
profit margins was most important during the stabilization program,
and it is also more readily susceptible to quantification than other
possible sources such as changes in product mix or input substitu-
tion. In reviewing requests for price increases, changes in short-
term production and in sales volume were taken into account to
some extent, but their influence was small and difficult to estimate
in the absence of information on actual and expected sales volume.
Under the stabilization regulations, net increases in labor costs
were calculated on the basis of trend rates of increase in output per
man-hour. The difference between changes in short-term output
per man-hour and these trend rates was used to calculate the po-
tential influence on profits from this source. The results are shown
in Table 7alongwith actual changes in profit margins. This source
more than accounts for the actual widening of profit margins for
nonfinancial corporations through 1972, and it accounts for about
half of the smaller cumulative rise in profit margins through 1973
(columns 3 and 4, Table 7). After the first quarter of 1973, percent





approximately a factor of 3 because quarterly changes are expressed ii1 terms of annual
rates for compensation and profits. Quarterly changes may not sum to totals of four times
cumulative changes because cumulative increments to profits were computed on the
basis of the percent margin prevailing in the first quarter of 1971.
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 157Changes in profit margins during the entire period seem to be ti
mainly attributable to cyclical developments, including changes in
output per man-hour, instead of to changes in the controls. The
rise in profit margins from the fourth quarter of 1971 to the first
quarter of 1972 may have been influenced by the transition to
Phase II, since prices also rose sharply, but it could also be ac-
counted for by the sharp rise in output per man-hour. Similarly, the
decline in profit margins in the last half of 1973 might be partly ij
attributableto the second freeze and dollar-for-dollar pass-through
of costs in Phase IV,butthe decline had begun in the second
quarter and could have been expected to continue on the basis of
larger increases in costs.
The data on profit margin changes do not support the view that
prices increased more rapidly than costs during Phase III. The ac-
celeration of inflation that began in 1973 was in fact accompanied
by a sharp reduction in percent profit margin expansion in the first
quarter when increases in materials input costs began accelerating.
Percent profit margins declined after the first quarter of 1973 as
prices, unit labor costs, and other costs rose more rapidly.
Profit data on an annual basis for selected industries indicate
that a major part of the 1972 increase in profits was accounted for by
manufacturing; and in 1973, by agriculture. In each case, much of
the increase in profits could be attributed to wider profit margins.
However, the amount of profits attributable to wider profit margins
in manufacturing over the entire period, $6.9 billion, was small
compared to the amount accounted for by large increases in short-
term productivity, $12.4 billion. In addition, because of the large
size of the manufacturing sector, the increase in prices that was ac-
companied by a widening of profit margins was smaller in that
sector than in agriculture. With prices of raw agricultural products
exempt, almost thirty percentage points of the increase in the price
deflator for agriculture was associated with wider margins on value
added, mainly during 1973. These data also show a slight narrow-
ing of percent margins for retail and wholesale trade in 1972 and
1973, even though both sectors were formally under regulations
permitting constant percent markups over costs.4°
The profit margin data show a broad pattern of conformity with
the regulations during the period of controls. In using profit data to
examine the consistency of cost and price increases, itmustbe
recognized that there are limitations resulting from the presence of
long-term contracts, the existence of inventories, and the possibili-
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tiesfor hedging in purchasing and pricing policies. The data clearly
show the importance of the unusually rapid short-term productivity
gains during the early part of the period in providing additional
real income that was accrued in the form of a slowing of price in-
creases and a rise in profit margins. They also show that the expan-
sion in profit margins that occurred during 1972 was consistent with
the stabilization regulations in force, and that the acceleration in
inflation occurring in early 1973 during Phase III was not accom-
panied by the wider profit margins that would be expected if bus i-
ness firms were raising prices more rapidly than their costs were
increasing.
Ihe limited potential of controls as a tool to improve price per-
formance by squeezing profit margins is illustrated by the data on
prices in Table 8. A major reason for the insensitivity of prices to
profit margin changes is that profits account for only a small fraction
of the value of output. Profits accounted for less than 10 percent of
output of nonfinancial corporations in 1970. The shift in output per
man-hour and profit margin trends in early 1973 reduced the por-
tion of the increase in prices related to changes in percent profit
margins, but the shift to more rapid inflation increased the influ-
ence on prices of maintenance of percent margins. Expansion of
percent margins after the first quarter of 1971, when they were near
a cyclical as well as a historical low, accounted for less than one
percentage point of the 8.7 percent cumulative rise in prices by the
end of 1973, and for only 0.3 of the 15 percent rise by the second
quarter of 1974. Maintenance of percent margins, through a rise in
profits per unit of real output sufficient to compensate for the rise in
output prices, accounted for an additional percentage point by the
end of 1973 and 1.5 percentage points by the second quarter of
1974. These data show that the consequences of limiting percent
profit margins to their cyclically low level at the beginning of 1971,
or reducing percent margins through erosion of the share of profits
in real terms, could have significant effects both on the rates of re-
turn on investment and on cash flow available for investment in
production capacity, even though price inflation in the corporate
nonfinancial sector would not have been significantly affected.
Moreover, the proportionate effect on consumer prices of a squeeze
on profits would have been much smaller than for prices in the
corporate nonfinancial sector during 1971—1974 because prices of
farm products and imported commodities (which are largely ex-
ternal to the corporate nonfinancial sector) were responsible for
much of the acceleration in inflation that occurred in 1973.
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 159TABLE 8 Prices and Their Relation to Changes in Profits and in Profq





Change in Change in in Rates of Percent
Implicit Percent Change of and Constant
Price Profit Output per Dollar Profit
Deflator Margin8 ManHourb Marginc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year and
Quarter Quarterly Calculated Increments to Price Change
197111 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1
In 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1
IV 0.1 —0.1 —0.1 0.0
19721 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.1
II 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
III 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0
Iv 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1
19731 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.1
II 1.1 —0.2 —0.4 0.1
III 1.1 —0.3 —0.4 0.1
IV 1.8 —0.3 —1.0 0.2
19741 2.7 —0.7 —1.5 0.3
II 3.0 0.2 —0.3 0.3
Cumulative
Periodd Cumulative Calculated Increments to Price Change
19711V 1.4 0.2 0.5 0.2
19721V 3.7 1.5 1.7 0.4
19731V 8.7 0.8 0.6 0.9
197411 15.0 0.3 —1.2 1.5
I
I
SOURCE; Same as for Table 7.
Calculations based on column 3, Table 6.
bCalculations based on column 3, Table 7.
• Calculations based nn column 4, Table 6.
dQuaerly changes may not sum to cumulative totals because of rounding, and cumula-
• tive totals for columns 2 and 4 may differ in addition because they are cumulated on the






C¶ profit Margin Limitations
Pricescould be increased under the stabilization regulations only
if an increase in allowable costs could be demonstrated. While cost
— increaseswere a necessary condition for price increases, they were
not a sufficient condition since limitations on profit margins were
imposed in some form throughout the program. Realized profit mar-
gins as a percentage of sales were limited to levels achieved during
a base period. The limitation was applied to individual firms and
computed for the consolidated accounts of the parent firm instead
— ofseparately by divisions, profit centers, or other accounting
entities. Base-period limits for Phase II were established by com-
puting the average profit margin for the best two of the three fiscal
years completed immediately before August 15, 1971, with the in-
clusion of more recently completed fiscal years permitted after
Phase III began in 1973.
Profit margin positions when the stabilization program began and
developments during the course of the program can be illustrated
in general terms by Federal Trade Commission data for manufac-
turing corporations (Table 9). These data show that profit margins
in the third quarter of 1971, when the stabilization program began,
were on average considerably below the apparent base-period
limits. For example, profit margins for all manufacturing averaged
8.6 percent in 1968 and 1969 compared to 6.9 percent in the third
• quarter of 1971 and 7.0 percent for the year. Relative to base-period
• limits, profit margins were then apparently highest for food and
kindred products and tobacco manufacturers, with considerable
room for expansion toward base-period limits in most other sectors.
During 1972, manufacturing profit margins rose from 7.1 to
7.7 percent, remaining on average well below base-period limits.
Sectors in which margins rose most markedly toward the limits
included printing and publishing, rubber and plastics products,
and lumber. Profit margins exceeding base-period limits were re-
ported during 1972 mainly by firms specializing in lumber produc-
tion, although this is not apparent in the aggregate data.
Profit margins on average moved close to base-period levels in
1973, particularly in nondurable goods manufacturing. Early in the
year, margins rose markedly in the lumber sector (and later in the
year, in several other sectors) to levels apparently above base-
period limits. These profit data are not adjusted for inventory
profits, in contrast to the data from the national income accounts dis-
cussed in the preceding section. In their treatment of inventory
profits these profit data are consistent with the computational pro-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.cedures in the stabilization regulations. There are several reasons,
however, why these aggregate data on average profit margins for
industries provide only a general indication of the degree to which
realized profit margins for individual firms were consistent with the
requirements for compliance with the stabIlization regulations.
Comparisons of base-period profit margin limits for individual
firms with their realized profit margins could be significantly differ- e
ent from comparisons of industry averages. Individual firms could s
choose their most favorable two years, and, in addition, many firms
are on a fiscal- rather than a calendar-year basis. Thus, the actual
difference between realized profit margins and base-period limits o
may have been wider than would be suggested by computations
based on industry-sector averages for two calendar years. On the
other hand, the variability of profit margins for individual firms is
much larger than for the averages, and realized profit margins may
exceed base-period limits for some firms even though this is not a
reflected in an industry average.
The data on sales and profits underlying published industry profit t
margins are also more inclusive than the data specified in the sta-
bilization regulations. For example, subsidiaries based abroad and t
mainly engaged in foreign operations were excluded from profit
margin computations under the stabilization regulations, and the
dollar devaluations in 1971 and 1973 significantly increased re-
ported profits for foreign subsidiaries of international corporations.
Moreover, farming, life insurance, and public utilities operations
were excluded if they were separate accounting entities. In general,
the broad definition of firms applied under the stabilization regu-
lations also obscures comparisons with data based on different
definitions.
Realized profit margins could, in addition, under certain condi-
tions exceed base-period profit margin limits without violating the
stabilization regulations. During Phase II, profit margin limitations
were not applied to firms that raised no prices above base-period Is
levels (prices charged in the thirty days before August 15, 1971, or
on May 25, 1970). During Phase III, profit margin limits were not
applied unless the firm increased prices by at least an average of r
1.5 percent above levels authorized on January 10,1973, and during si.
Phase IV they were not applied to firms that had not increased r
prices above levels legally prevailing during the mid-1973 freeze, r•
A significant fraction of firms did not raise their prices above base- fl
period levels during 1972, and in late 1973 sales and profits attribu- b
table to exempt prices in areas such as exports, lumber, and other
sectors exempted later could be excluded from profit margin corn-
164 Kosters Iputations. Firms that had increased prices, but later reduced them
sufficiently to compensate for the revenue received from these
price increases, were also relieved of profit margin limits. In addi-
tion, relief from profit margin limitations or adjustments to base-
period limits were often granted through the exceptions process.
al Relief of this sort reflected well-documented special circumstances
experienced by a firm, for example, a major change in its financial
Ed structure. The special rules applicable to firms experiencing losses
or very low profits could also raise average profit margins without
al placing the firms at the low-profit end of the distribution in violation
ts of the regulations. It may be concluded that the published aggre-
gate profit margin data cannot be easily translated into evidence on
the extent of compliance with the profit margin limits under the
is stabilization rules.
Beginning in the second quarter of 1972, orders to reduce prices
Dt and (when this was possible) to make refunds were issued to firms
whose profit margins exceeded base-period levels. Occasionally,
Fit there were denials of requests for price increases from firms ap-
a- proaching base-period limits, with the most noteworthy cases being
those for two major auto companies in late 1972. By the end of 1972,
it only a small number of firms showed profit margins in excess of
re base-period limits, and they were heavily concentrated in the
e- lumber and construction sectors. In construction, the immediate
.s. linkage between profit margins and pricing was weak, and special
procedures were eventually developed for that sector. In other see-
tors, remedial actions included refunds where feasible, price reduc-
a- tions where markets would not be unduly disrupted, or payments
at to the Treasury to reflect profit margin overages. In many instances,
the presence of special circumstances that had not been dealt with
Ii- through the exceptions process led to negotiation of compromise
settlements of profit margin overage problems.
• s The marked acceleration of price increases in early 1973 and the
d large increases in reported profits for the first quarter of 1973 led
many observers to conclude that there was widespread noncompli-
ance with cost-justification and profit margin regulations.4' Yet
reports on prices, costs, and profits for the first part of the year
•g showed few instances of probable violation of the stabilization
d regulations.42 In addition, since cumulative profit margins in these
reports in most instances did not reflect results for a completed
fiscal year, many of the apparent profit margin overages may have
been attributable to seasonal factors.
Profit margin limits were applied throughout the remainder of
the program, with remedies prescribed when base-period limits
Controlsand lnflaUon: An Overview 165wereexceeded and denial of requests for price increases when efi
firms were approaching base-period limits. However, the sector-by- to
sector decontrol process during Phase IV complicated the applica- pr
tion of profit margin limits, because exempted activities could be di.
excluded from profit margin computations. Often only crude adjust-
ments could be made by firms with production operations in thi
several sectors, some of which were exempted, and application of jn
profit margin comparisons became increasingly arbitrary and corn-
plicated during the decontrol process. th;
art
pI
V.CONTROLS AND EFFICIENCY cii
Theconcept of efficiency is central to economics, and the general oj
principle that competitively determined prices and wages are con- OI
sistent with efficient resource usage is well known. Price and wage rq
controls can give rise to inefficient resource use, because suppres- stj
sion of price and wage levels also usually influences interrelation- P
ships between them. Controls can introduce inefficient business e
practices, and lead to patterns of resource use that add to ineffi- P
ciency arising from existing market imperfections. Moreover, their
influence is extended over a major share of the economy. The mag- e
nitude of the costs that may be imposed by controls is not easily
estimated, but constantly changing conditions in the marketplace
make it virtually impossible to manage a system of stringent con-
trols without creating distortions in resource use. Particular in-
stances of market disruptions, misalignment of prices, wasteftil
business practices, or inequitable wage relationships resulting
from controls have usually become evident, but public reaction to
these costs builds slowly because most of the costs are hidden and
not easily quantified. tii
Unfortunately, most of the evidence on distortions resulting from
controls is .fragmentary and anecdotal and does not lend itself to
quantification of the resultant costs. Yet the symptoms of ineffi-
ciency were sufficiently pervasive and their potential cost suffi-
ciently important to merit a brief general discussion of the problem
in addition to that contained in the preceding sections. a.
w.
Symptoms of Inefficiency
Duringthe first year of cor1trols, there was some evidence that they
were interfering with the price adjustments necessary to maintain m
166 Kostersefficiency and avoid shortages, but the evidence was limited mostly
to the lumber sector and to a small number of situations in which
pricing to reflect increases in current production costs led either to
e dispersion in prices for similar products or to prices too low to sat-
isfy current demand.43 The stabilization regulations were based on
the idea that price adjustments should be allowed to reflect cost
increases, with shifts in demand in most instances expected to be
accommodated through changes in output. It became apparent in
the early months of the program, however, that situations would
arise in which application of the regulations would forestall some
price increases that were necessary to maintain efficiency.44
In markets with relatively inelastic supply, short-term demand
changes that were large relative to short-term cost increases created
one
class of problems under cost pass-through regulations. Pricing
of radio and television advertising, for example, had traditionally
reflected shifts in audience ratings of shows in addition to more
stable factors, and these demand-related changes were not accom-
panied by short-term cost changes. Since export prices were ex-
empt from controls, demand increases for internationally traded
products created incentives to export and opportunities to earn
windfall profits for traders buying at controlled domestic prices and
ir exporting at higher world prices.
Differences among industries and among the structures of firms
y within industries sometimes complicated the application of cost
pass-through regulations. In the case of sugar, some fruits and vege-
a tables, and, later, lumber, vertically integrated firms often experi-
a enced no short-term cost increases that could be used to justify
higher prices, while other firms purchasing inputs such as raw agri-
cultural products and standing timber in exempt markets were
bidding up raw materials input costs and raising prices propor-
tionately. The presence of large inventories in some cases also
weakened the linkage between cost increases and current demand
conditions. In some sectors in which prices of major inputs were
not exempt, short-term demand increases created an incentive for
firms to increase current operating costs (such as wages), both to
provide the basis for price increases and to avoid increasing profits
above base-period levels. The importance of this indirect influence
on wages in the economy is uncertain, but at least one case in
which a wage adjustment was apparently motivated mainly by
profit margin considerations was brought to the attention of the
Cost of Living Council in 1973.
The problem of prices on world markets rising above prices per-
mitted under domestic controls, thus stimulating increased exports,
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 167first appeared for cattle hides during the ninety-day freeze. Similar cr
conditions developed when world prices moved above domestic
prices for several products (such as lumber, zinc, and molasses)
during 1972. While rising prices on world markets posed few diffi- be
culties for domestic price controls during 1972, the surge in dollar it
prices of most commodities traded in international markets during
1973 (including the prices of metals, petrochemicals, and fertilizer) afl
posed problems for any system of domestic controls.
Extens ion of controls to raw agricultural commodities would
have created similar problems in that sector.46 The stringent limits
on domestic prices after the June 1973 freeze, with world prices
continuing to rise, threatened diversion of domestically produced
supplies to export markets. Exemption from domestic controls was
granted for commodities such as copper scrap and a number of a
other nonferrous metals. Prices of fertilizer and petrochemical
products were also exempted so as to reduce incentives for trade h
diversion, and price adjustments to levels above those generally a
permitted under the standards were granted for other commodities ii
such as copper and aluminum.47 b
When prices of more and more commodities were held below
market clearing levels in late 1973, symptoms of inefficiency be- d
came increasingly widespread and diverse. Curtailment of do- a
mestic supply was sometimes threatened by increased exports, c
reduced production to avoid losses, and failure to expand produc- p4
tion through use of marginal production capacity. Lack of avail- si-I
ability and wide differences in prices of materials inputs compli- r
cated production planning and threatened to disrupt production ai
schedules. Distribution and purchasing operations were compli-
cated by multiple prices and instances of bartering in order to re-
duce costs or obtain scarce materials, and black markets were fre-
1 48 1. . .. . Short4 quennyreported.Such custortions were instrumental in shaping
public attitudes toward decontrol. R
CostPass-Through and Product Mix
Limitingprice increases to cost increases, instead of controlling bi
overall processing margins with complete flexibility in relative cy,
prices, in some circumstances exacerbated shortages for certain b.
products. For industries operating at capacity levels, incentives to
shift the mix of products were created under regulations that linked vi
price increases to cost increases, without permitting increases in cy
some prices to offset reductions in others. These incentives were tii
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Acreated even though full pass-through of cost increases was per-
mitted, and price increases to reflect these cost increases could be
spread over a broad range of product lines. For cyclical reasons and
because of changes in import competition or other factors, prof-
itability of individual product lines may diverge from that of other
product lines produced by the same firm. When conditions changed
and demand was sufficiently strong to support expanded produc-
tion of relatively more profitable lines, incentives were created for
Id shifting production toward high-margin product lines and for rais-
ing prices for those product lines to the extent justified by overall
cost increases.
During 1973, when demand levels pressed strongly on available
production capacity, there were several industries in which short-
ages became severe for product lines that had previously been
al produced at low profit margins. Some users were forced to switch to
le higher-quality paper when lower-quality paper became unavail-
able.49 Some of the most marked steel shortages were in product
lines such as concrete reinforcing bars, mining roof bolts, and
baling wire, which had earlier been subject to strong import corn-
w petition. A wide range of petrochemical inputs and products pro-
e- j ducedby petroleum refiners were in extremely short supply, after
a period in which prices in the chemical industry had been cycli-
cally depressed. The shortages of petrochemical feedstocks were
• c- particularly noteworthy, because allocation of a disproportionate
il- share of cost increases to these products was encouraged by the
Ii- regulations that delayed price increases for gasoline, diesel fuel,
)fl andhome heating oil.
e-
e- Shortages
Reportsof shortages were pervasive in late 1973, and the reports
often attributed shortages to the price controls.5° Shortages are the
inevitable counterpart of controls that keep prices below market
clearing levels in a simple, static, analytical framework, and the
existence of shortages is prima facie evidence that controls are
binding. Shortages have sometimes emerged, however, in strong
'e cyclical expansions, and phenomena such as lengthening order
in backlogs, slower delivery schedules, and temporary unavailability
to of products or materials have been quite common. Thus, in an en-
vironment with rapidly changing supply conditions and strong
in cyclical demand, shortages and related phenomena may be par-
re tially attributable to concern with customer-supplier relationships





r)expressed through maintenance of relative stability in materials
availability and prices. F:
Nevertheless, controls can exacerbate shortages by influencing Ic
demand and available suppiy. If controls are generally thought to p1
be holding prices below market levels, the risk of a decline in
prices of materials purchased as inputs and temporarily held in
inventory is reduced, and the potential for implicit capital gains if 1
pricesare decontrolled or price increases are granted is enhanced. p
In addition, controls that effectively constrain prices increase the tli
probability that essential materials or products may not be available p
when they are needed. This encourages users to purchase materials $
before they are needed and hold them temporarily in inventory as S
a hedge against possible disruption of production schedules. Legal z
limits on prices foreclose the possibility of bidding up prices to ci
obtain essential materials when those materials are immediately
necessary to maintain production schedules or to avoid delays. c
If purchasing policies were significantly influenced by controls c
in this manner, these policies would have raised demand above r
normal current production requirements for products and materials f
in which the difference between price limits and market prices
was largest and the potential for shortages greatest. A tendency for
inventory buildup would be expected and it might be reflected in
somewhat earlier purchases of supplies and materials by final users
instead of larger inventories for manufacturers and distributors.
The pattern of inventory accumulation for all manufacturers and Cl
distributors indicates that firms were generally attempting to in-
crease inventories in late 1973 and early 1974, even though serious si
shortages and prices significantly below market levels were con- t
centrated in a limited range of basic materials and products. There
were widespread reports of particular instances in which advance
material purchases were made and purchasing practices were
tailored to shortage conditions. There were reports from construc- Busin
tionfirms of advance delivery of concrete reinforcing bars to avoid
costly delays in projects should these materials not be available on
schedule.5' In the case of petroleum products, there were reports of b
a buildup of propane inventories and gasoline storage, and gasoline
stocks rose toward the end of each month in anticipation of the e
granting of new price increases.52 There were also reports of pur- 11
chases of certain scarce materials for use in bartering for other ma- 0.
terialsin short supply because prices were kept below market
levels. 0
In1973, when price ceilings were made applicable to individual °
firmsinstead of industry-wide, incentives may have increased for S
170 Kostersals acquiring inventories in excess of immediate production needs.
• Firms having established relations with suppliers constrained by
in low price ceilings had a strong incentive to take delivery of all sup-
•t plies that they were allocated because prices from alternative
in sources of supply were often higher and further price increases
were being granted periodically. In the fall of 1973, for example,
if price ceilings for domestic copper producers were 60 cents per
ed pound. Moreover, fabricated copper products could be priced on
he the basis of costs ranging from 60 cents per pound for domestically
ble produced copper or 77 cents per pound for copper scrap to over
als $1.00 per pound for spot market purchases of imported copper.
as Similar conditions prevailed for other nonfeirous metals such as
gal zinc, lead, and aluminum as well as for a variety of steel and petro-
to chemical products.53
ely It is extremely difficult to distinguish between the influence of
controls and the influence of cyclical factors on the widespread in-
ols cidence of shortages in 1973. The changes in market conditions
we resulting from shifts in supply or demand were the underlying
als forces creating pressures for either higher prices or shortages. It is
es possible that the controls themselves made an independent contri-
or bution to the problem by raising demand for inventories, reducing
• in domestic supply through diversion to export markets, and weaken-
ers ing price incentives to expand production. Broad indicators such as
unfilled orders and the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments were
md cyclically strong, but they may themselves have been influenced by
in- the existence of controls. While the unusual pervasiveness of
MIS shortages in 1973 is strong evidence that controls contributed to
their severity, the controls may in additon have made shortages





There are various ways in which the controls may have altered
of business practices and decisions in addition to their direct influ-
ne ence on prices. It is difficult to judge the importance of these
• he effects either for their short-term costs or for their longer-term
ur- influence. Some effects, such as changes in accounting practices to
obtain greater flexibility for price increases or changes in produc-
cet tion methods or product mix, mainly involve short-term costs. The
costs of other changes, such as those involved in the consequences
ual of changes in investment decisions or pricing practices and market
for structure, may become evident only after a period of several years.
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by changes in cost allocation or accounting procedures designed to
avoid the full impact of controls regulations or that resulted from
the need to develop specific information for review by stabilization
authorities and supporting data for compliance auditing. Business
practices that led to inefficient real resource use in production and
distribution imposed costs that are more difficult to measure. Pur-
chasing policies designed to hedge against shortages, or disruption
of smooth production flows when shortages were realized, imposed
costs that are more obvious but not necessarily more important than
the costs of inefficient patterns of input use. The emergence of
bartering arrangements as a substitute for transactions in the mar-
ketplace contributed to excessively large inventories, complicated
marketing by increasing information and search costs necessary to
assure timely delivery at the lowest available prices, and led to less
efficient distribution than could be expected under uniform prices
4 in the marketplace.
An example from ferrous scrap markets illustrates how controls
can reduce efficiency. Steel scrap generated as a by-product of pro-
duction operations for large firms was subject to price controls, but
scrap collected from obsolete or worn-out items was not. Covering
all of the junk dealers in the country was impractical, and higher
prices in that market could stimulate increased scrap collection.
Inefficiency in scrap distribution occurred when scrap subject to
controls was sold through bartering arrangements in exchange for
scarce items that it was used to produce, such as concrete rein-
forcement bars. In products produced from steel scrap, distribution
inefficiencies occurred in response to wide differences in prices.
These prices reflected differences in production costs that de-
pended on the source and cost f the scrap input as well as on the
fraction of scrap used in furnaces. Another reported business prac-
tice, for which costs imposed are more easily ascertainable, was
transshipment of scrap from an industrial plant at one location to
steelmaking facilities owned by the same company at another loca-
tion to avoid sale of the scrap at controlled prices at one market
location and purchases of a similar quantity at uncontrolled prices
at another.55
It was frequently alleged that controls were adversely affecting VI.C
production levels, particularly when profit margin limits were an
effective constraint. Evidence based on production levels attained
is ambiguous because the absolute limits on levels of production
capability are usually impossible to define precisely for any firm or
industry. In addition, firms operate in a dynamic and changing
172 Kostersenvironment in which they must make decisions regarding small
to adjustments in the production process, expansion of some portion
(Ti o production operations, or cutbac s in output by sca ing down
less efficient operations or closing down obsolescent plants. Over
ss time, marginal changes in current production through such deci-
sions could have a significant offsetting influence on price move-
r- ments. Thus, it is possible that delays in price adjustments and
price ceilings could attenuate production responses that would
otherwise help to smooth adjustments in prices to changes in
in demand.
of This discussion of controls and their costs can be summarized
r- by brief consideration of two points. The first point is that the short-
run costs of controls—at least as they were administered during the
to Economic Stabilization Program—were apparently not enormous.
ss Evidence of adverse effects during the period of controls is gen-
erally not readily apparent in broad measures of production or other
indicators either for individual industries or for the overall econ-
is omy. Thus, in spite of widespread reports of shortages, inefficient
business practices, and misallocation of resources, normal meas-
it ures of economic activity for most sectors did not show pronounced
adverse effects that could be directly traced to controls. The second
point is that the costs of controls are nonetheless real, and they are
n. not adequately captured by reference only to normal measures of
to production and economic activity. Resources are used to administer
or controls, with costs borne both by the government and the private
sector. Symptoms of inefficiency that can obviously be traced to
fl controlsimpose additional real costs, even though these costs are
5. difficultto quantify. In addition, costs of a more subtle type are
obscured by normal measures of economic activity because the
prices that are used in computing the value of economic output can
c- be less closely identified with the value placed by society on meas-
iS ures of economic output as prices diverge more and more from
o market values.
.g VI.CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
n Whatever direct impact the controls regulations had on wages and
d prices, controls also influenced the context in which economic
n policy was made. To the extent that the controls temporarily sup-
pressed price and wage increases, the full influence of market
forces became evident to policymakers and the private sector only
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after some delay. To the extent that market pressures in specific
sectors led to rapid price increases or dislocations under the con-
trols, high-level attention was focused on possible policy changes c
that could influence supply or demand to relieve the pressures
placed on controls by a market environment that was forcing prices
up. Thus, the controls at times facilitated the development of spe-
cific policies that could help to reduce market pressures by shifting
supply or demand—policies that were usually more complex but
more promising than a simple limitation of shortrun price or wage
increases. Issues raised by this broad economic role of controls may
be of more lasting importance than quantification of their direct
effects on prices and wages in any period.
Controlsand Demand Management
Thepossibility that the existence of a program of wage and price
controls may have influenced the expansiveness of monetary and
fiscal policy is of particular importance for evaluating the full in-
fluence of controls on inflation.56 Indeed, one of the thorniest issues
in any attempt to assess the quantitative effects of controls is the
issue of what components of economic policy should be treated as
independent of controls. It is possible, for example, that controls
were viewed as providing some short-run insurance against infla-
tion, thereby shifting the balance toward accepting the risks of
more expansionary policies than would have been planned in their
absence. Controls may also have suppressed inflation sufficiently
to mask for a time inflationary pressures building up in the econ-
omy, and consequently they may have delayed a recognition by
policymakers that less expansionary policies were called for.
The effect that controls may have had on macroeconomic policy
can be explored by examining some evidence concerning the SI
period 1971—1974. Even though no definitive conclusions can be Ia
drawn from them, official statements suggest that controls were re- ni
garded as providing a measure of protection against inflation, p
thereby permitting a more expansionary pattern of policies than
would otherwise have been considered prudent.57 The imposition p•
ofcontrols was also accompanied by requests for investment tax
credits and tax reductions to stimulate the economy. In addition,
the most widely used explanation of the manner in which controls ct were expected to help reduce inflation was that a major portion of OflIi
thecontinuing inflation in 1971 could be attributed to the lingering T
effects of past inflation. The price and wage projections from stand-
174 Kostersard models made it difficult to account for the rate at which inflation
was occurring prior to the control period on the basis of demand
conditions prevailing before controls were imposed. The controls
were viewed as reducing expectations of inflation by providing a
period of lower inflation more consistent with the degree of slack in
e- labor and product markets. Yet the risks of placing too much re-
kg liance on controls and moving toward overly expansive policies
ut were also explicitly recognized and cautioned against.58
The limits that were placed on prices under controls, along with
incentives to keep prices down voluntarily (either out of a spirit of
Ct cooperation or to avoid confrontation and possible audit for viola-
tions), inhibited market testing. Market signals were muted, and in-
formation on accumulating market pressures was received only
after delays which added new uncertainty to government policy
planning. The importance of this influence of controls during 1971—
1974 is uncertain, but it may have delayed a turn toward more
restrictive demand management policies.
Both monetary and fiscal policies were expansionary during the
a- early phases of controls. These policies were generally viewed as
appropriate for stimulating higher output and employment levels,
particularly in the early stages of the recovery when fiscal policy
was most expansionary. Federal deficits averaged $19 billion in
is 1971 and 1972, although the full-employment deficit averaged only
a- $5 billion, and small surpluses were achieved on both bases in
of 1973. The net expansionary effect on the budget of tax and expen-
ir diture changes introduced with the New Economic Policy was esti-
ly mated as $1.1 billion for fiscal year 1972,60 a small impact compared
a- to actual deficits at that time. Monetary policy remained expan-
sionary during almost the entire period; the money supply in-
creased at an average rate of about 7 percent, but the most rapid
expansion took place in the latter part of 1972. Although in retro-
spect these policies were overly expansionary, particularly in the
e latter part of the period, the mistake appears to have resulted
mainly from the deficiencies of economic forecasts rather than from
policies that differed from those on which the forecasts were based.
n The upsurge in inflation that began in 1973 was not foreseen by
• n professional forecasters.61
Lx
Controlsand Other Stabilization Policy Initiatives
Theintroduction of controls in the U.S. economy, and intermit-
1- tently of incomes policies ofvarious kinds in other countries, is less
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview 175a tribute totheir demonstrated durability and effectiveness than to a1 the lack of constructive alternatives for responding to public pres- st'
sures to"do something" that would have a visible and direct effect
be
oninflation. It is appropriate that these pressures should converge
on thegovernment in democratic societies, and the government
should give high priority to actions and policies that can help to h
contain inflation. Whether the imposition of generalized wage and
1
price controls is the most constructive response in most instances, ti
however,is open to question. It would be desirable to place more
emphasis on the development of imaginative policies that would
help to idntify and attack the real economic problems of our a
society. Policy approaches that could help to increase supply, re- h
duce costs, facilitate adjustment, or improve productivity would
I, work more slowly and indirectly to reduce inflation, but such e
policies would also have less potential for simultaneously imposing
costs through reduced efficiency and disappointing public expecta- e
tions. c
The establishment of a system of wage and price controls has,
however, facilitated the formation of institutional structures for
bringing together representatives of labor, business, the public
sector, Congress, and the executive branch, in order to identify and f
discuss problems and explore possible approaches from different
viewpoints. Since the cooperation, support, acquiescence, and ex-
pertise of each of these groups is necessary in varying degrees to r
the success of the effort (particularly the cooperation of organized
labor), controls provide a framework for mobilizing public interest
and attitudes and promoting a serious exchange of views, state-
ments of positions, and negotiation of compromise approaches.
Among the major forums for addressing broad policy issues and
individual cases where the Pay Board and advisory committees of
Phase II, along with earlier exploratory meetings, the Construction
Industry Stabilization Committee, and the Labor-Management si
Advisory Committee and tripartite committees established in the
food and health sectors during phases III and IV.
Whilethe existence of a program of wage and price controls
provided the immediate impetus for identifying and bringing to-
gether spokesmen representing various interests and involving
them in the process of working toward solutions, controls may not
have been a necessary precondition for establishing effective struc-
j turesfor policy discussions and problem solving. The Construction
Industry Stabilization Committee (which could draw upon au- a
thority for direct controls before broader controls were imposed) s
and the Food Wage and Salary Committee (which could not do this
176 Kosters) after controls for most sectors were terminated) are examples of
- structuresdeveloped to deal with specific problem areas. It might
t be possible to establish similar structures in other instances, and
these might contribute to the working out of industrial relations
t problems and the rationalization of wage patterns without their
) having authority to impose mandatory controls. Structures such as
j labor-management advisory committees set up to play a consulta-
tive and supportive role in the formation of national economic
policy have often made modest but valuable contributions. The
I Conference on Inflation in September 1974 represents another
r approach to public dialogue on problems and issues. While controls
have mobilized active participation and sometimes provided sup-
:1 port for compromises by those representing relatively narrow inter-
a ests to facilitate the achievement of broader goals, cooperation and
g participation in the resolution of many problems might often be
elicited without the spur of comprehensive price and wage
controls.
During 1971—1974, the stabilization program also provided struc-
tures within the federal government for bringing together cabinet
c members responsive to different constituencies, a staff capability
d for identifying discussion policies that contributed to inflation, and
it a cabinet-level spokesman to focus attention on the inflationary
implications of policy decisions. The main forum for internal policy
:o review during Phase II was the Cost of Living Council itself, while
d the food and health policy committees were the most important
forums during other phases of the program.
Controls, with their potential for market disruption, provided
s. strong incentives to search for policy actions that could increase
d supply or restrain demand and thus reduce inflation. But the de-
velopment of ways for the federal government to focus more atten-
tion on the inflationary consequences of government policy actions
should not be dependent on controls. Controls on food prices are
e certainly not a necessary condition for systematic consideration of
the potential impact on inflation of federal farm policy, an area in
which federal government policy decisions are of major importance
for production and prices. The Council on Wage and Price Stability,
g in some respects a successor to the Cost of Living Council, may
contribute to the evolution of an internal government structure for
discussion, review, and action on economic policy issues influ-
encing inflation. The procedures for systematic budget review
adopted by Congress may also contribute to improved price
I) stability.
15 The resurgence of inflation in 1973 gave new impetus to a search
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pressure of rising costs on controls. Stabilization committees often
provided a labor-management structure for the discussion of
promising approaches and served as a catalyst for their implemen-
tation.62 The rise toward capacity production levels, particularly in
early 1973 in many of the industries producing and processing basic
materials, focused attention on the question of whether sufficient
resources were being devoted to capital investment. Adequacy of
capital investment and the contribution that additional new invest-
ment could make to improved productivity growth were two con-
siderations that formed the background for the sectoral decontrol
process during the last part of 1973 and early 1974. Adequacy of
rates of return and willingness to make new investment commit-
ments were factors considered in decontrol decisions. Securing
capacity expansion commitments as controls were removed was
part of an intricate process to facilitate orderly sectoral decontrol.
Investment commitments provided a supporting rationale for
sequential decontrol decisions, and they represented a significant
effort to coordinate policies for achieving capacity expansion needs
with policies for removing controls.63
Because the controls imposed limits and delays on price in-
creases and profit margins, investment decisions could have been
adversely affected by controls. The influence that controls actually
had on business investment, however, is not clear. Several factors
suggest that their effects in reducing investment were small: the
perceived short-term character of the controls, the influence of
longer-term price and cost prospects on many investment decisions,
the initial favorable attitude of the business community toward
controls, and their apparently small impact on prices during 1972,
particularly for industries producing basic materials, in which
capacity limitations became most apparent in 1973. Other factors,
however, suggest a larger effect: the full effect of prices in signal-
ing increased profitability of investment was reduced to the extent
that some prices were held below market levels, cash flow to
finance increased investment was reduced, lower profitability im-
peded external financing, and incremental decisions to alter pro-
duction operations or keep marginal production facilities in opera-
tion may have been affected. In the administration of controls,
policies regarding investment evolved from the maintenance of as
neutral a policy as possible during the early stages of controls to the
explicit encouragement of new investment in decontrol decisions.
There was no apparent weakness in business investment during




























Iie "temporary" nature of the controls and to their initial favorable
effect on public confidence.64
of The flow of investment decisions in the economy plays a signifi-
n- cant role in cyclical movements in demand. The investment tax
in credit introduced with the New Economic Policy was aimed at
ic least as much toward stimulating demand as toward the need for
nt providing increased productive capacity. Moreover, the capacity
of problem that emerged in 1973 was concentrated in the basic ma-
terials sector instead of being spread throughout the economy.
n- These developments were apparently not foreseen by the firms in
ol the industries concerned, and they were only belatedly recognized
of by the government. Improved forecasts of capacity needs could
it- have helped to reduce inflation from this source as well as to
smooth investment flow and its impact on aggregate demand.
as Better information on actual production capacity could have con-
tributed to more informed assessments of capacity needs. More-
or over, in developing projections of potential output to guide manage-
nt ment in setting short-run demand policies, measures of industrial
ds production capacity may be as important as measures of em-
ployment conditions. While there is little reason to assume that
fl- capacity needs for particular industries could be foreseen any more
en accurately by a government agency than by firms and investors in
Ely the private sector, more detailed and carefully assembled informa-
)rS tion might contribute to an improved assessment of intentions and
he prospects by both the government and private sectors.
of
rd Controlsand the Public
72, When inflation becomes an issue of public concern, price increases
ch for particular products come to be looked at mainly from the point
rs, of view of their contribution to inflation instead of their role in
• allocating resources in response to reduced supply or increased
nt demand. The existence of formal controls provides a channel for
to responding to public and political pressures to deal with particular
price increases. The temptation is strong to apply rigid controls to
specific products, to set limits on the size of individual price
increases, or to apply tight rules for sectors in which increased
is, stringency can make no contribution to the real problem. For
as example, the policy response to the fact that lumber prices were
he rising more rapidly than other prices in 1972 was to apply more
iS. stringent controls, when decontrol might have made a greater
ng contribution toward the underlying problem of supply. Restraining
e pricesinsectorswhere demand pressurescouldnot be
Controlsand Inflation: An Overview
I179accommodated through short-term supply increases was generally
inconsistent with the broad approach of Phase LI, but it was as
• ab:
awkward politically to exempt lumber prices then as it was easy to po
exempt them in 1973 when lumber prices were falling, as
The retention of mandatory controls on food prices for Phase III
provides an example of control policy oriented more toward the an
presumed adverse political reaction to voluntary, self-administered m4
controlson products whosepriceswere expectedtorise m
significantly than toward the economic contribution that continued tn!
mandatory controls on such prices could be expected to make. The ta
public impact of retention of mandatory controls on food prices was D
apparently small because the public was not persuaded by
statements explaining how the surge in food prices could not be pr
attributed to the shift to Phase III because mandatory controls on th
food prices were being continued. Until ceiling prices were s
imposed for meat, the continuing mandatory controls on food prices p
were structured to permit pass-through of costs, and they had little m
disruptive effect on markets because they permitted large price p
increases. The meat ceilings were addressed in part to another ti
goal—preservation of wage-cost stability—and their influence on
wage trends should be weighed against whatever costs they o
imposed on the economy. Continued mandatory controls on food p
prices may also have assisted the government in managing its
internal policy decisions to increase supply. They may also have ml
increased the acceptability of these policy changes to some ir$
segments of the food industry. ti
The shift in public attitudes reflected by congressional debate SLI
and action between the first half of 1973 and the last half of 1973
through early 1974 leads one to ask whether the political process
will permit implementation of controls in a manner intended to all
avoid distortions and inefficiency in the economy.65 A significant th
shift in public attitudes toward the merit of stringent controls did SP
not occur until after the graphic illustrations of market disruptions
and adverse effects on supply that occurred during the freeze be- re
ginning in June 1973. These demonstrations of the futility of P1
stringent controls under the conditions prevailing then and the ra
shortages that emerged later in the year apparently led to increased
recognition that stringent controls could be counterproductive. re
rn
Limitationsof Controls
Oneof the most fundamental but often misunderstood features of b
controls is the limited potential they have for contributing to lower ni
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j.inflation, that is, lower inflation than would have occurred in their
as absence and without the adverse side effects that most of their pro-
to ponents would prefer to avoid. Under emergency conditions (such
as a major war effort) the scale of the diversion of resources that
must be accomplished is so large that major strains are inevitable,
and the inefficiency and inequity of controls and rationing may be
more tolerable than other methods of securing the necessary adjust-
se ments. The goals of peacetime incomes policies in Western indus-
trial societies, however, have been much more limited than con-
ie tainment of the inflationary effects of wartime resource diversion.
as Direct controls on prices and wages to effect the goals of incomes
policies have usually been viewed as a supplement, to reliance on
De pricing in the marketplace, although admittedly in some economies
)fl theyhave been viewed as an essential supplement. Draconian
re systems of controls have generally been avoided, except for short
es periods, both because their effects are not tolerated for long by the
le major participants in the economy and because the costs they im-
pose on the economy exceed any benefits that might be achieved
er through lower inflation.
)fl Themanner in which controls are expected to affect the process
ey of inflation is usually not carefully articulated in discussions of the
)d possible contribution of incomes policies. In some instances ref-
its erence is made to market power and to a range of discretion that
ye may exist In establishing administered prices or negotiating wage
increases for large economic units.66 Of course, the existing struc-
ture of markets falls short of fully competitive conditions and re-
Lte sults in price and wage relationships that depart from those that
73 would prevail under such conditions. If controls are aimed pri-
manly at offsetting these departures from fully competitive price
to and wage relationships, their limited influence over inflation and
nt the strains they would be confronted with should be viewed in per-
-id spective.
Aiming controls toward offsetting noncompetitive wage-price
• e- relationships by squeezing profit margins of firms exercising market
• of power would compel explicit attention to the question of whether
rates of return were adequate to support investment and mainte-
nance of production capacity in the sectors affected. A one-time
e. reduction in prices and rates of return of this kind would, of course,
make no continuing contribution to reduced inflation.,
Similarly, a policy aimed at reducing relative wages in some of
the more highly organized high-wage sectors of the economy could
be maintained only until the influence on relative wages of labor
market power was offset, and there would be no further continuing
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erinfluence on the rate of inflation. Even if a realignment of relative g
wage positions could be achieved by use of controls, the forces that ha generated the prevailing patterns are undoubtedly. strong and iii
wouldpose a continuing threat of labor strife to re-establish the
previouS wage differentials.
Except for very short periods, the impact on prices of restricting
the pass-through of increased costs and squeezing corporate profits ti
is much smaller than seems to be generally recognized. Between
the beginning of 1971 and the end of 1973, the cumulative rise in t
prices attributable to inflation within the corporate nonfinancial
sector was 8.7 percent. If profit margins had been held to their low b
cyclical position at the beginning of the period, the rise in prices
would have been reduced by less than one percentage point.
Incomes policies could also be developed that are not oriented h
toward restructuring broad relative price or wage relationships.
These policies could be directed toward a roughly parallel reduc-
tion in inflation across all sectors. The controls of 1971—1974, for
example, were initially designed tolimit price adjustments c
throughout the economy to the magnitude of short-term cost in- a
creases and to influence the size of cost increases primarily by
establishing a standard to reduce the size of wage increases. This
was viewed as an approach that would help achieve an actual re-
duction in inflation during a period in which generalized excess
demand was not an immediate threat. Revision of expectations and
the development of contracts and practices reflecting lower rates
of inflation were expected to exercise a stabilizing influence, simi-
lar in kind but opposite in direction to the influence that was NOT
attributedto the buildup of inflation in the late 1960s on price in-
creases in 1970 and 1971.
Price developments in 1973, particularly the surge in food prices
and the large increases in the prices of basic materials and petro-
leum later in the year, created a vastly different economic environ-
ment from what had been projected. These price developments
should not necessarily be regarded as a challenge to the validity of
the concepts on which the controls were initially based, nor should 4
they necessarily be regarded as a demonstration of the inappro-
priateness of the limited purposes of the controls under the condi-
tions that were projected in 1971. Instead, they serve as a reminder
of the crucial importance for short-term price performance of
market developments in a limited number of critical sectors, such as
food and energy. More generally, they serve as a reminder of the
flexibility of the price system as a mechanism for promoting rapid
adjustments to change in the marketplace. The price surge that be-
182 Kostersgan in 1973 also indicated that, whatever contribution controls may
have made during 1972, they could have little marginal influence
d under the conditions that emerged in 1973 unless control policy
was shifted toward establishing rigid ceilings and supplementing
the ceilings with subsidies and non-price-rationing mechanisms as
necessary—which would of course have been a policy with an en-
ts tirely different conceptual basis.
n Controls may in some instances make a limited contribution
n toward facilitating adjustment to lower inflation when no large
shifts in supply or demand are projected. Such a contribution could
w bemade by altering public expectations of inflation, for example, if
inflationary expectations are an important source of momentum in
price and wage increases. Controls are vulnerable to serious failure,
however, by neither containing inflation nor avoiding potentially
s. costly inefficiency when major supply or demand shifts occur. The
normal function of the market system, of course, is to generate auto-
)r matic adjustments of prices and consumption to changes in market
ts conditions—changes that are constantly occurring and usually not
accurately foreseen. This raises the question of whether the costs
that controls may impose before they can be gracefully terminated,
is or over time if continued indefinitely, may exceed the benefits of
whateverljmited contribution they may make.
ss
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13.This analysis is an application of wage-structure concepts to the particular in-
flationary conditions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Wage-structure concepts at
have been applied in many studies of wage determination under collective 19.F
bargaining, with concepts in this closely related body of ideas called "wage a
contours" (Dunlop), "orbits of coercive comparison" (Ross), "wage constella-
tions" (Harbison), and "neighboring strategic wage rates" (Bronfenbrenner and
Holzman). See Martin Bronfenbrenner and Franklyn D. Holzman, "Survey of 20. T
Inflation Theory,"Amencan Economic Review, September 1963, p. 618. In
14.In discussing labor cost, productivity, and price prospects at a Cornell Uni- P
versity conference held in April 1972, Lloyd Ulman recognized that these con- 21.T!
ditions were favorable for an apparently successful incomes policy: "Thus, the W
policyof restraint could be effective or appear to be effective (if the stimulus 22.Se
to expansion came from other quarters), even if it did not succeed in its con-
ventional task of restraining wage settlements directly. This could be regarded C
as the Indian Rope Trick Theory of incomes policy" (Ulman, "Phase II in 23. S
Context," p. 91).
- tu
15.This study includes little discussion of Phase I, the wage-price freeze of 1971, TI
which is the subject of a careful study by Weber, In Pursuit of Price Stability, sa
cited earlier, Weber was director of the Cost of Living Council during the
freeze and served as a public member of the Pay Board during Phase II. 24.Jc
A very brief and lucid sketch of the stabilization program is contained in
John T. Dunlop, "Inflation and Incomes Policies: The Political Economy of
184 Kosters -IiRecent US. Experience," Eighth Monash Economics Lecture (Monash Uni-
S
1 versity,Australia, October 1974).
j6.The director of the Cost of Living Council was Donald Rumsfeld, who was
also counselor to the President. The council chairman was the secretary of the
treasury, initially John B. Connally and beginning in the second quarter of
1972, George P. Shultz. In addition to the Pay Board and Price Commission,
e the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee was continued as an opera-
ting unit and the Committee on Interest and Dividends was established. In
addition, three advisory committees were created: the Health Services industry
-' Committee,the Committee on State and Local Governmen,t Cooperation, and
the Rent Advisory Board.
17.The guideposts outlined in the 1962 Economic Report of the President were
d
put forward as a contribution to public discussion, and the impact on public
• attitudes of widespread discussion of the concept may be illustrated by the
- openingsentence of the policy statement adopted by the Pay Board on
• November 8, 1971, establishing the general standard: "Millions of workers in
a, the Nation are looking to the Pay Board for guidance with respect to per-
missible changes in wages It may also be illustrated by the reaction of
the press to the statement of the Labor-Management Advisory Committee of
February 26, 1973, stating that "no single standard or wage settlement can be
- equallyapplicable at one time to all parties in an economy so large, decen-
e, tralized and dynamic." See, for example, "The Magic Number isa Blur," New
York Times, March 4, 1973; and Edward Cowan, "Hocus-Pocus on Wage
Guidelines," Times, March 11, 1973.
18.Later in 1972, in response to an amendment to the Economic Stabilization Act,
provision was made for larger than previously permitted pay increases to reflect
introduction of improvements in "qualified fringe benefits," mainly pensions.
The coal settlement, the first case reviewed by the Pay Board, included a large
• increase in labor costs that was necessary to assure the solvency of the pension
•n- fund. It provides an example of how wage issues are complicated by circum-
'ts
' stancesunique to the situation under review.
ye
19.For a perceptive discussion of problems in the administration of wage controls
ge and the emphasis that was placed on a general standard with few exceptions,
Ia- see Arnold B. Weber, "Making Wage Controls Work," The Public Interest,
Winter 1973, pp. 28—40.
of 20.The chairman of the Pay Board was George H. Boldt, and the board was
initially composed of fifteen members—five each representing the general
H public,business, and labor.
21.The chairman of the Price Commission, composed of seven public members,
was C. Jackson Grayson.
22.See, for example, the President's address announcing the freeze, and "Back-
a- ground for the Post-freeze Economic Stabilization Program," Cost of Living
Council, October 7, 1971.
•in 23.See Don R. Conlan, "1973 U.S. Economic Outlook," New York Times, Sep-
tember3, 1972, and the editorial, "Phase ill Controls: Too Vague, Too Narrow,
.1 Too Weak," in Business Week, March 10, 1973, in which labor leaders were
said to be "openly scornful of the idea that wage increases can be held to the
he 5.5 percent guideline of Phase II."
24.John T. Dunlop became the director of the Cost of Living Council when
in Phase III was introduced. He had been chairman of the Construction Industry
of Stabilization Committee since its inception.
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I18525.Statement of the Labor-Management Advisory Committee, February 26, 1973;
reprinted in Senate Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization of the Corn- P
nsittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, "Statement of Dr. John T.
Dunlop," Hearings: Oversight on Economic Stabilization, 93d Cong., 2d
sess., January 30 and 31 and February 1 and 6, 1974, p. A-67. Dunlop's entire
statement was reprinted in Cost of Living Council, Economic Stabilization 35.Tn
Program Quarterly Report for January 1—May 1, 1974 (1974), pp. 129—381. C
26.Tripaitite committees were established to review wage adjustments in the G
food industry and the health services sector where self-administration was not C
permitted. oq
27.See Senate Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization, "Statement of 36.S
Dr. John T. Dunlop," App. A, in which a large number of inflation projections W
for1973 are tabulated. The actual rise in the GNP deflator was over 5 percent 37.F
while most projections were between 3 and 4 percent. The difference between
the actual and projected rise in consumer prices was even larger because food P
prices rose much more rapidly than most other prices, and food accounts for a
I
largershare of the consumer price index than of the GNP deflator. 38.
28.For an expression of the administration's view of the wage outlook, see the
statement of George P. Shul, secretary of the treasury and chairman of the
Cost of Living Council, in Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, Hearings on S. 398: A Bill to Extend and Amend the Economic Stabil-
ization Act of 1970, 93d Cong., 1st sess., January 29, 1973, pp. 11—12.
29.See Marvin H. Kosters, Controls and Inflation: The Economic Stabilization
Program in Retrospect (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1975), pp. 73—75, for a discussion of the influence of
the June 1973 freeze on the food sector,
30.Commitments of some form were made in connection with decontrol for a
total of eighteen industry sectors. See Economic Stabilization Program Quar-
terly Report for January 1, 1974—May 1, 1974, Chap. 2; and "Removing Con-
trols: The Policy of Selective Decontrol," in Office of Economic Stabilization, p
Historical Working Papers on the Economic Stabilization Program, Part 2
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 859—948.
31.See John T. Dunlop, "Toward a Less Inflationary Society" (remarks to the
Society of American Business Writers, San Francisco, May 6, 1974), in Eco-
nosnic Stabilization Program Quarterly Report for January 1, 1974—May 1,
1974, pp. 599—607, for a discussion of areas in which federal government initia-
tives could make a contribution toward reducing inflation.
32.See, for example, Robert J. Gordon, "The Response of Wages and Prices to the
40It First Two Years of Controls," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 3
'd (1973):765—778; and William D. Nordhaus, "The Falling Share of Profits,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1974);169—208. See also Daniel
J. B. Mitchell, "Phase II Wage Controls," Industrial and Labor Relations
41 Review, April 1974, pp. 353—375; Michael Wachter, "Phase II, Cost-Push Infla-
tion and Relative Wages," American Economic Review, June 1974, pp. 482—
491; Edgar Feige and Douglas Pearce, "The Wage-Price Control Experiment—
Did It Work?" Challenge, July-August 1973, pp. 40—44.
33.See, for example, Milton Friedman's discussion of this question in his News-
week column of November 8, 1971; reprinted in Milton Friedman, An Econo-
mist's Protest (Glen Ridge, N.J.: Thomas Horton, 1972), pp. 20—22.
34.An estimate of the impact on construction wage increases of the Construction
Industry Stabilization Committee was developed by D. Q. Mills in "Explaining
186 KastersPay Increases in Construction: 1953—1972," Industrial Relations, May 1974,
pp 196—20 1. His estimate of a 2.5 percent annual effect in reducing construc-
tion wage increases is, as he notes, sensitive to the treatment of the significant
influence of a wage-structure variable incorporated into his analysis,
5.This argument is noted, for example, in Robert M. Solow, "The Case against the
Case against the Guideposts," in George P. Shultz and Robert Z. Aliber, eds.,
Guidelines, Informal Controls, and the Marketplace (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1966), p 45; and Edward Cowan, "US Aide Outlines Tactics
on Wages," New York Times, March 1, 1973.
36.See Kosters, Controls and Inflation, for a discussion of selected sectors in
which large increases in prices were concentrated
37.For an analysis of term-limit pricing agreements, see Frederic L. Laughlin,
"An Evaluation of the Price Commission's Policy of Term Limit Pricing during
Phase II of' the Economic Stabilization Program" (Ph.D. diss., George Wash-
ington University, 1975).
38.Means (M) and standard deviations (cr) for the difference between year-to-year
changes in prices and unit labor costs were as follows:
PrivateNonfarm Nonfinancial Corporations
M (1950—1973) —0.11 (1959—1973) —0.06
(1950—1973) 2.47 (1959—1973) 2.45
(19711V—19731V) 0.69 (19711V—19731V) 0.82



















Serial correlation was high: the Durbin-Watson statistic was 0.5 for each re-
gression.
40.It was pointed out by Joel Popkin in "Prices in 1972: An Analysis of Changes
during Phase II," MonthlrjLaborReview, February 1973, pp. 16—23,thatprices
of finished goods seemed to have risen by more at the manufacturing level
than at the retail level during 1972.
41.Lack of compliance was usually implied, though not explicitly alleged, in calls
for stricter controls or a return to controls similar to those of Phase II. New
— YorkTimes editorials calling for stricter controls appeared on average more
than twice a month between February and June 1973, usually immediately
after wholesale and consumer price increases were announced. The Business
Week editorial of March 10, 1973, called for a shift from "voluntary" to manda-
tory rules, better enforcement, and farm product price ceilings. Gardner Ackley
in "And Now Phase Four" (Dun's, August 1973, p. 11) said that Phase III had
"allowed large numbers of firms in many leading industries to violate the profit
margin limitations."



















ig42.A preliminary review of reports covering the first four months of 1973 showed 51.TIf
only three firms out of nearly 500 without adequate cost increases to SU1)POrt fei
the increased revenues they had received from price increases. An internal Nd
analysis of eight industry sectors also showed price increases averaging signifi.
cantly less than accumulated cost increases, both during the first four months rei
of the year and by June, when the freeze was imposed. By July 12, over 900 re- 52.TI1
ports on costs and profits had been received from firms with annual sales of of
over $250 million. According to nearly 500 reports from nonfood firms that had
been reviewed, price increases averaged less than 1.5 percent above levels 53.Clj
authorized when Phase III began for about 450 firms, and only 6 firms that had Jag
increased prices by more than 1.5 percent had profit margins exceeding base- an
period levels. In the food sector only 7 out of almost 150 firms showed profit b
margins exceeding base-period levels. 54.Fc
43.For example, sugar and certain other food product prices were differentially atj
affected by technical details of the regulations, and modifications in the regu- a
lations or exceptions for particular firms were made to alleviate these situations. 0
The influence of controls on lumber markets during Phase II is discussed in P
Kosters, Controls and Inflation, pp. 79—81. U
44.During the first week of Phase II, for example, rising cattle prices, with the 2
largest meat-packing firms subject to prenotification and a delay of up to thirty 55.A
days for price increases, showed the need for special provisions for inputs with a
volatile prices in order to avoid market disruption and markedly different treat- a
ment of large and small firms.
45.In that case, as in many others, the matter was brought to the attention of the A
Cost of Living Council informally, and it was dealt with without the need for 56. 1
formal action.
46.An extensive discussion of the relationship between farm product prices and ti
food prices, the influence of controls on processing and distribution margins,
and the influence of meat price ceilings on prices and supplies is contained in 57.E
Kosters, Controls and Inflation, pp. 61—78. 58. E
47.See, for example, Sidney Fish, "Controls Spur Exports of Scarce Commod- 59.1
ities, Journal of Commerce, December 14, 1973, p. 1. 60.1
48.Such instances were frequently reported on the basis of surveys by the Na- 61.
tional Association of Purchasing Managers and in trade publications and news- 62.S
papers. Some instances in sectors such as petrochemicals and plastics and L4
nonferrous metals are discussed in Cost of Living Council, Economic Stabil- rnj
ization Program Quarterly Report for October 1, 1973—December 31, 1973, 63. S
Chap. 2 (pp. 5—34). See also Herbert Koshetz, "Black Market in Textile Yams
Is Seen," New York Times, January 15, 1974, p. 49.
49.The case of paper is listed among the "proven" distortions in Senate Siibcom- 64.So.
mittee on Production and Stabilization, "Statement of John T. Dunlop," App. tfi
Q,p.A-114. E
50.Shortages were widely reported in trade publications and in the news media
in late 1973 and early 1974. Widespread concern about the incidence and 65. ?
causes of shortages led to three major surveys in late 1973 by the National
Association of Purchasing Managers, the National Association of Manufac- Pt
turers, and the National Association of Business Economists. Long lists of a.r
materials in short supply were reported by each, and shortages and black III
markets were frequently attributed to the controls. See also "Managing in a
Shortage Economy," Business Week, November 10, 1973, p. 150; and "More C
and More Scarcities: Who Is Feeling the Pinch," U.S. News & World Report, P
September 3, 1973, p. 15. 66.Ed
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._i .J51.These practices were reported by construction contractors, who frequently pre-
ferred higher prices to shortages. See, for example, "Builders Warn: No Rebars,
No Building," Business Week, December 8, 1973, p. 37; and Michael K.
Drapkin, "Steel Concrete-Reinfoning Bar Shortage May Severely Hurt Non-
hs residential Building," W011 Street Journal, January 21, 1974, p. 24.
52.The behavior of inventories is emphasized in Richard B. Mancke's analysis
of of the influence of petroleum price controls in Performance of the Federal
ad Energy Office (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975).
'ls 53.Changes in the spread between prices on domestic and world markets between
ad January 1, 1973, and November 30, 1973, for aluminum, copper, lead, and zinc
• are shown in Economic Stabilization Program Quarterly Report, for Octo-
fit ber i—December 31, 1973, p. 31.
54.For discussions of specific instances of shortages and inefficiency that were
attributed to controls in a wide range of industry sectors, see the statements
and testimony of representatives from the private sector in Hearings: Oversight
on Economic Stabilization (see note 25, above) and Senate Subcommittee on
Production and Stabilization of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, Hearings: Economic Stabilization Act of 1974 93d Cong.,
2d sess., February 19 and 21 and March 6, 1974).
55.A brief discussion of price controls in the steel industry and a summary of
th actions that were taken to modify the regulations is contained in Appendix V
of "Removing Controls: The Policy of Selective Decontrol," Historical Work-
ing Papers on the Economic Stabilization Program, August 15, 1971, to
he April 30, 1974, Part 2, pp. 942—947.
for 56.In his foreword to Kosters, Controls and inflation, George P. Shultz observes
that "the frequently heard argument that 'needed' fiscal and monetary stimula-
nd tion will be possible if there is an adequate incomes policy' is proof enough of
the most pernicious aspect of controls."
• i 57.Economic Report of the President, 1972, p. 69, pp. 101—102.
58.Economic Report of the President, 1973, p. 53 and ibid., 1972, p. 96.
id- 59.ibid., 1974, p. 31.
60.Ibid., 1972, p. 71.
'Ia- 61."Statement of Dr. John T. Dunlop" (see note 25, above), p. A-i.
62.Such initiatives were facilitated by the fact that the director of the Cost of
nd Living Council at that time also served as chairman of the Productivity Corn-
'it- mission,
73, 63.See "Removing Controls: The Policy of Selective Decontrol" in Historical
ms Working Papers on the Economic Stabilization Program, Part 2, pp. 859—948,
for a detailed discussion of the decontrol process.
64.Some evidence of a possible small favorable influence on investment during
p. the controls period is contained in Roland C. Droitsch, "The Impact of the
Economic Stabilization Program on Business Fixed Investment," Historical
ha Working Papers on the Economic Stabilization Program, Part 2, pp. 949—988.
nd 65.Most of the significant legislative initiatives in Congress before mid-1973 were
ml intended to tighten controls. After mid-1973 most were intended to relieve the
pinch of controls; many bills and resolutions to end controls were introduced,
of and several resolutions or bills were introduced to provide relief from controls
Lck insectors such as food, fertilizer, petrochemicals and steel. See the listing of
ia legislative activities from May 1, 1973, to April 30, 1974 in "Congress and
)re Controls," Historical Working Papers on the Economic Stabilization Program,
rt, Part 1, pp. 220—243.
66.Economic Report of the President, 1962, p. 185.
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R.A. Gordon
University of California at Berkeley
Thispaper provides a broad and at the same time rather detailed al
survey of the American experience with wage and price controls
during 1971—1974. Several pages of Introduction and Background ci
are taken up in laying the groundwork, reviewing the behavior of
aggregate demand, wages, and prices during 1965—1971, and offer-
ing some suggestions as to why the accelerating inflation in wages
and prices was slow to respond to the deflationary forces that
brought on the recession of 1970. This introductory discussion is
concluded with the suggestion that there is some reason to believe c
that by mid-1971 the rate of increase in unit labor costs was be-
ginning to taper off, with the probability of both a deceleration in t
therate of price increases and improved profits. The inference,
presumably, is that the freeze and subsequent detailed control of
wages and prices were not necessary.
A description of the controls through the successive phases then
follows, after which Kosters proceeds to consider the effects of the ri
program on the general performance of the economy and on the be-
havior of wages and prices. The suggestion is offered that "delays
in price increases induced by the controls" contributed to an overly q
expansionary monetary policy in 1972 and the early months of
1973. No supporting evidence for this proposition is offered.
The discussion of the effect of controls on wages does not dig
very deeply. The chief emphasis is on the fact that by 1972 the p
wagestructure had come into reasonable balance. Union wages
governed by long-term contracts, which had been lagging behind
at the end of the 1960s, had finally caught up, and thus the upward
pressure on wages was easing, apart from any effect of the controls.
In the construction industry, however, wage controls clearly did
have a significant influence. c
Thediscussion of the impact of controls on prices does not probe
very deeply. One interesting point made is that at the beginning of
1972 there was considerable leeway for industrial prices to rise
under the rules initially established, apart from the additional
leeway for price increases later granted by the Price Commission.
The author also considers the extent to which the relation between
price changes and changes in unit labor costs was affected by price
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____________controls. The conclusion reached is that "price increases con-
formed more closely to unit labor cost increases under the cost
pass-through rules of the controls than would have been expected
at that stage of the cycle." This conclusion is based on rather
slender evidence, although other evidence that could be developed
might well support it.
Interestingly, in this section of the paper, the author pays more
d attention to the effect of the controls on profits than he does to
Es their effect on prices and, particularly, on wages. The general con-
d clusion is that rising profits and widening profit margins added rela-
tively little to the rate at which prices were increasing. Percent
profit margins did widen somewhat during Phase II, but most of
this resulted from increases in man-hour productivity associated
it with rising output during a cyclical upswing. And profit margins
is were relatively low when controls were imposed. A further con-
clus ion of this part of the analysis is that the use of percent rather
than constant dollar markups during phases II and III added rela-
n tively little—not much more than 10 percent—to the rate of
inflation.
)f I shall devote the rest of my comments to the author's "Conclud-
ing Discussion." The title of this last section is accurate. It is a
"Concluding Discussion," not a clear-cut set of conclusions de-
rived from the data and analysis of the preceding sections. Four
•- broadtopics are discussed: (a) the effect of the controls on the man-
agement of monetary and fiscal policy, (b) the possibility of devel-
ly oping alternatives to mandatory controls, (c) the influence of public
of pressures to "do something" about inflation, and (d) the limitations
of controls. The discussion is couched in fairly broad terms, and, for
ig the most part, these concluding observations do not depend di-
Le rectly on the detailed empirical presentation in the main part of the
paper. I must confess that I found this concluding section not very
satisfactory. The presentation is sometimes imprecise; the docu-
d mentation provided is almost entirely from official sources; and
i. otherrelevant research is largely ignored.
d The paper has relatively little to say about the extent to which the
controls might have led to an overly expansionist monetary and
fiscal policy in 1972—1973 and thereby contributed to the accelerat-
ing inflation in 1973—1974. Indeed, one can hardly begin such a
discussion without separating out the relative importance of gen-
eralized demand-pull and cost-push forces and of special supply
shortages, something which the author does not attempt. One can
agree with him, however, that a major problem at the beginning of
1973 was the failure of government and private forecasters to pre-
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11.dict the sharp acceleration in prices that was then starting up. This firt
leaves a critical question to which the author does not address him-
self. If the forecasts had been more accurate, what government
actions should then have followed? Tighter monetary and fiscal di
policy, possibly bringing on a recession earlier than the one that we tr
are now experiencing? Or a decision to stick with Phase 11 and not sc
move on to the more relaxed controls of Phase III? And/or to take p
more vigorous action to deal with the specialized shortages that o
were developing? Or what? An attempt to answer these questions fai
would have extended the paper considerably. e
Kosters then goes on to consider possible alternatives to manda- fd
tory controls when the public pressure for government action
against' inflation requires that something be done. Can we develop, ti
in his words, "imaginative policies that would help to identify and c
attack the real economic problems of our society" and would permit p
us to avoid the costs of controls—controls which will in any event e
be certain to disappoint public expectations. Having asked this al
challenging question, Koster has little to propose except some set of e
institutional arrangements "for identifying and bringing together r
spokesmen representing various interests and involving them in
the process of working toward solutions Some consideration
is also given to what the government might do to stimulate invest-
ment, particularly in shortage areas; to the effect of controls on in- C
vestmentin 1972—1973 (apparently not very serious); and to the 0
failureof both business and government to predict the capacity ii
shortages that developed in 1973. e
After some general observations on the role of public opinion in
pushing the government into controls, Kosters concludes with
some final observations on the limitations of controls. Among the
points made, the following might be mentioned. Holding down
profits in oligopolistic industries would have made a trivial contri-
bution to the fight against inflation. Something more might have
been gained by reducing relative wages in the more highly orga-
nized sectors of the labor market, but the obstacles here are almost
insurmountable. Under the circumstances that prevailed in 1973,
the Phase II type of controls could not work. By then, for controls
to be effective even for a short period, we should have had to move
to rigid ceilings supplemented by rationing and subsidies. And, of
course, that was never in the cards.
And Kosters ends by asking once again whether wage and price
controls in peacetime do not entail costs significantly greater than
the benefits they presumably, bring. The question is asked in the
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Iis final sentence but not explicitly answered. But it is fairly clear what
he believes is the correct answer.
So much for a summary of the paper. As the former associate
director of the Cost of Living Council, Kosters is obviously ex-
tremely well informed, and the paper is replete with useful—if
sometimes overly detailed—information. Kosters carries out his
•e
: promiseto provide an "overview" of the background and operation
of the controls. But this "overview" also takes in a good deal of
familiar scenery. In general, there is too much detail, and to some
extent too close exposure to the trees obscures the view of the
a- forest.
The presentation is not as analytical as it might be. The quantita-
) tiveanalysis, so far as it goes, does not penetrate very far; sophisti-
cated regression analysis is largely eschewed; and there are sur-
it prisingly few references to the work of others who have sought to
evaluate the effectiveness of the controls—including some who are
is at this conference. It might also have been useful to have had some
evaluation of the relative extent to which the controls operated to
restrain wage increases, on the one hand, and price increases, on
the other. Is it true, as has been argued, for example, that the chief
effect on wages came through the effect on prices?
On the whole, Kosters is correct in arguing that the sharp ac- . celerationin price increases in 1973 owed little to the relaxation
of controls in Phase III. But I think there is evidence that in some
industries the relaxation of controls did make an observable differ-
ence. The overall impact, however, was not large compared to the
in push coming from food and raw materials.
•e
)f
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